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TRACEY MACLIN
M A RY L A N D v K I N G : T E R RY v O H I O
R E D U X
Forty years ago, the Supreme Court’s search incident to arrest doc-
trine was settled and relatively clear: as a routine matter, police
could, without any particularized suspicion, search an arrestee for
weapons and any evidence in his possession that the arrestee might
try to conceal or destroy. The twin rationales justifying a search
incident to arrest—officer safety and evidence preservation—
marked the outer boundaries of police authority. In Schmerber v
California, the Court explained that these two justifications “have
little applicability with respect to searches involving intrusions be-
yond the body’s surface.”1 According to Schmerber, “the interests in
human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects
forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence
might be obtained.”2 Thus, Schmerber required either a judicial war-
rant or some emergency that justified an exemption from the war-
rant requirement for the police to invade an arrestee’s body.3
Tracey Maclin is Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
Author’s note: I would like to thank Sarah Bidinger and Colleen Laffin for their
excellent research and editing assistance.
1 Schmerber v California, 384 US 757, 769 (1966).
2 Id at 769–70.
3 As Professor Wayne LaFave has explained: “[I]t seems clear from the Schmerber case
that a more demanding test must be met when the search incident to the arrest involves
the taking of a blood sample or the making of some similar intrusion into the body.”
Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 5.3(c) at
220–21 (West, 5th ed 2012) (footnote omitted).
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Despite the apparent clarity of search incident to arrest doctrine,
Justice Lewis Powell suggested in a concurring opinion in United
States v Robinson that such searches should not be limited to the
objectives of police safety and evidence preservation.4 In Robinson,
a police officer looked inside a cigarette package found in the coat
pocket of a person arrested for driving with a revoked license. The
Court, in an opinion by then-Justice William Rehnquist, held that
this was a valid search incident to arrest. Rehnquist explained that
“in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person
is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amend-
ment.”5 Although stated in expansive terms, the holding in Robinson
was consistent with the rationale of the search incident to arrest
doctrine.6 Although the police officer did not find any evidence or
fruits of the offense for which Robinson was arrested, the search
of the cigarette package was “reasonable” because it ensured that
Robinson did not possess a weapon that might be used to harm the
arresting officer. The Court was unwilling to qualify an officer’s
“general authority” to search incident to arrest on the “rather spec-
ulative judgment” that persons arrested for traffic offenses “are less
likely to possess dangerous weapons than are those arrested for other
crimes.”7
Although joining Rehnquist’s opinion, Justice Powell wrote sep-
arately that “an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest
retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of
his person.”8 According to Powell, once a lawful arrest occurs, any
privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment “is subordi-
nated to a legitimate and overriding governmental concern.”9 Going
beyond then-existing doctrine, Powell argued that “a valid arrest
justifies a full search of the person, even if that search is not narrowly
limited by the twin rationales of seizing evidence and disarming the
4 United States v Robinson, 414 US 218, 237 (1973) (Powell, J, concurring).
5 Id at 235 (1973).
6 Existing precedents confined police authority to search the arrestee for weapons and
for “any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruc-
tion.” Chimel v California, 395 US 752, 763 (1969).
7 Robinson, 414 US at 234 (footnote omitted).
8 Id at 237 (Powell, J, concurring).
9 Id.
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arrestee.”10 Powell reasoned that search incident to arrest is “rea-
sonable” because an arrestee’s privacy “is legitimately abated by the
fact of arrest.”11
Powell’s views on this issue were not embraced by the Court for
forty years—until Maryland v King.12 At issue in King was whether
a Maryland law requiring forensic testing of DNA samples taken
from persons arrested for violent crimes violated the Fourth
Amendment. The purpose behind the statute, like other DNA col-
lection laws, seemed obvious: collecting and analyzing DNA sam-
ples advances the capacity of law enforcement to solve both “cold
cases” and future crimes when the government has evidence of the
perpetrator’s DNA from the crime scene. Maryland did not contend
that the DNA statute promoted either officer safety or evidence
preservation. The Maryland Court of Appeals held the statute was
unconstitutional because the government interests promoted by the
law did not outweigh King’s right to privacy.13 In a 5–4 decision,
the Court, in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, upheld the
Maryland law—and presumably the similar laws of twenty-seven
other states and the federal government.14
On the day King was decided, Orin Kerr, a respected criminal
procedure scholar, described King as “hugely important as a practical
matter, but it’s not very interesting from a theoretical or academic
standpoint.”15 I disagree; King is a significant ruling in terms of our
10 Id (footnote omitted). In a footnote, Powell quotes a Ninth Circuit ruling, Charles v
United States, 278 F2d 386, 388–89 (1960), which included the following statement: “Once
the body of the accused is validly subjected to the physical dominion of the law, inspections
of his person, regardless of purpose, cannot be deemed unlawful, unless they violate the
dictates of reason either because of their number or their manner of perpetration.” Robinson,
414 US at 237 n 1 (Powell, J, concurring).
11 Robinson, 414 US at 238 (footnote omitted) (Powell, J, concurring).
12 Maryland v King, 133 S Ct 1958 (2013).
13 King v State, 42 A3d 549, 555–56 (Md 2012).
14 According to a study by the Urban Institute, published shortly before King was an-
nounced, “about half [of the twenty-eight states that have enacted laws authorizing DNA
collection from arrestees] align their collection practices with convicted offender laws and
authorize collection from persons arrested for any felony crime. The other half of states
limits collection to a subset of felonies, typically involving violence, sexual assault, or
serious property crimes. Seven arrestee DNA states also collect from individuals arrested
or charged with select misdemeanor crimes. Broader than any of the state laws, federal
law authorizes collection from all arrestees and non-US citizens detained by the US
government.” Julie E. Samuels et al, Collecting DNA at Arrest: Policies, Practices, and Im-
plications, Final Technical Report 25–26 (Urban Institute, May 2013).
15 Orin Kerr, A Few Thoughts on Maryland v King (The Volokh Conspiracy June 3, 2013),
online at http://www.volokh.com/2013/06/03/a-few-thoughts-on-maryland-v-king-2/.
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understanding of Fourth Amendment law.16 Individuals and orga-
nizations who rarely agree on constitutional issues criticized the
decision. Conservative Republican Senators Rand Paul and Ted
Cruz, the New York Times editorial pages, the American Prospect, and
the American Civil Liberties Union all condemned King.17 More-
over, Justice Samuel Alito, a former federal prosecutor, acknowl-
edged during the oral argument that King “is perhaps the most
important criminal procedure case that this Court has heard in
decades.”18 The result in King was so important—and so contro-
versial—that retired Justice John Paul Stevens publicly endorsed
the Court’s ruling.19
Although Justice Kennedy’s opinion in King suggests otherwise,
King has the potential to fundamentally alter Fourth Amendment
law. Indeed, it is analogous to Terry v Ohio.20 Before Terry was
decided in 1968, the Court had never authorized police to detain
or search a suspicious person without probable cause to arrest. Al-
though police officers frequently performed “investigative stops,”
car searches, and weapons frisks on evidence short of probable cause,
the Court had never approved such tactics.21 Indeed, as Justice Wil-
16 See also Erin Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and the Divided
Court, 127 Harv L Rev 161, 161 (2013) (describing King as “no ordinary Fourth Amend-
ment case,” and noting that it “represents a watershed moment in the evolution of Fourth
Amendment doctrine and an important signal for the future of biotechnologies and po-
licing.”).
17 See Rand Paul, Big Brother Says “Open Your Mouth!”, American Conservative ( June
10, 2012), online at http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/big-brother-says-
open-your-mouth/; Senator Ted Cruz, press release, Statement on SCOTUS Decision in
Maryland v. King ( June 3, 2012), online at http://www.cruz.senate.gov/record.cfm?idp
342973&&; Editorial, DNA and Suspicionless Searches, NY Times ( June 3, 2013), online
at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/04/opinion/the-supreme-court-rules-on-dna-and-
suspicionless-searches.html?_rp0; Scott Lemieux, Scalia Gets It Right, American Prospect
( June 3, 2013), online at http://prospect.org/article/scalia-gets-it-right; ACLU, press re-
lease, Comment on Supreme Court DNA Swab Ruling (Maryland v. King) ( June 3, 2013),
online at https://www.aclu.org/criminal-law-reform/aclu-comment-maryland-v-king-de-
cision.
18 Transcript of Oral Argument, Maryland v King, No 12-207, 35 (Feb 27, 2013), online
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-207-lp23.pdf.
19 Justice John Paul Stevens (Ret), speech to American Constitution Society Convention,
Capital Hilton Hotel, Washington, DC (June 14, 2013) (while admitting that he had not
read the briefs in King, Justice Stevens stated, “I think I would have voted with the majority
if I were still on the Court.”).
20 Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968).
21 In the classic article on the subject, Professor LaFave characterizes stop-and-frisk
techniques as “a time-honored police procedure [where] officers . . . stop suspicious persons
for questioning and, occasionally, . . . search these persons for dangerous weapons.” Wayne
R. LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67
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liam Douglas emphasized in his dissenting opinion in Terry, the
Court had ruled “precisely the opposite over and over again.”22 By
departing from those precedents and embracing an open-ended
balancing formula, Terry held that a frisk for weapons is permissible
when an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a suspect is
currently armed and dangerous, even if the officer lacks probable
cause to arrest that person. When it was announced, Terry could
be narrowly read: a frisk for weapons is permissible only when an
officer’s safety is threatened. The Court explained in Terry that the
decision did not address “the constitutional propriety of an inves-
tigative ‘seizure’ for purposes of ‘detention’ and/or interrogation.”23
As Justice Douglas predicted, however, the “hydraulic pressures”
exerted on the Court “to water down constitutional guarantees and
give the police the upper hand,”24 combined with a balancing anal-
ysis, eventually persuaded the Court to enlarge police search-and-
seizure powers in a wide swath of cases, many of which had nothing
to do with police safety.
Like Terry, King alters the “rules of game” and significantly ex-
pands the government’s authority to search persons subject to cus-
todial arrest. Just as a balancing analysis made it easy for the Court
to extend Terry’s rationale to different scenarios between police and
suspicious persons, King’s reasoning can be used to support collec-
tion and analysis of DNA samples from other persons subjected to
governmental restraint (such as persons arrested for misdemeanors
or traffic offenses or detained for investigative stops), or from those
who possess diminished privacy interests vis-à-vis the government
(such as public school students, driver’s license applicants, and law-
yers). Indeed, because King approved suspicionless searches of per-
sons under a free-form balancing analysis, it will be difficult to cabin
the Court’s logic when government officials seek innovative search
Mich L Rev 39, 42 (1968). Stop-and-frisk procedures were a staple of police procedure
long before Terry sanctioned the practice. See Lawrence P. Tiffany et al, Detection of Crime
at 10–17 (Little, Brown, 1967) (distinguishing stop-and-frisk practices, like “field inter-
rogation” and “aggressive patrol,” from traditional police procedures involving arrest or
search incident to arrest); id at 15 (noting that “[m]inor traffic infractions are [ ] often
used by the police to justify stopping for questioning or searching.”). According to one
1967 study of the practice, although police regularly “stop and question suspects on the
street when there are insufficient grounds to make an arrest, . . . this important law
enforcement practice has been either ignored or treated ambiguously by courts and leg-
islatures.” Id at 6.
22 Terry, 392 US at 36 (Douglas, J, dissenting) (footnote omitted).
23 Id at 19, n 16.
24 Id at 39 (Douglas, J, dissenting).
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powers in other contexts in which individuals arguably possess di-
minished privacy interests. As Professor Barry Friedman com-
mented shortly after the decision, King “will have ramifications far
beyond DNA testing, affecting much of policing in the 21st cen-
tury.”25
This article explains in more detail why King is so important.
Part I summarizes Justice Kennedy’s opinion and Justice Antonin
Scalia’s dissent, and offers some criticism of the Court’s opinion.
Part II explains why the Court’s precedents do not support the
decision. Part III addresses the implications of King’s reasoning, and
explains why the holding will not be confined to persons arrested
for violent felonies. Finally, Part IV explores the similarities (as well
as one important difference) between the judicial styles exhibited
by the Court in King and Terry.
I. The Court’s Reasoning in King
DNA testing in the United States began in 1987. It has had
a significant impact on the criminal justice system.26 Initially, DNA
databases included only “those classes of offenders with a high re-
cidivism rate, such as sex offenders and violent felons.”27 Today,
every state and the federal government collects and analyzes DNA
from all persons convicted of felonies. Lower federal and state courts
have uniformly upheld DNA collection from convicts. In light of
the investigative capabilities provided by DNA technology, “the
collection of DNA samples from individuals arrested for criminal
misconduct has been advocated by police officials and endorsed by
25 Barry Friedman, The Supreme Court Fails the Fourth Amendment Test, Slate Magazine
(June 5, 2013), online at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/
2013/06/dna_collection_in_maryland_v_king_the_supreme_court_fails_on_the_fourth
.html.
26 Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement’s Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34
Wake Forest L Rev 767, 768 (1999); compare Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent:
Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong at 5–6 (Harvard, 2011) (explaining that “[s]ince
DNA testing became available in the late 1980s, more than 250 innocent people have
been exonerated by postconviction DNA testing,” and that “DNA exonerations have
changed the face of criminal justice in the United States by revealing that wrongful con-
victions do occur and, in the process, altering how judges, lawyers, legislators, the public,
and scholars perceive the system’s accuracy.”); Erin Murphy, A Tale of Two Sciences, 110
Mich L Rev 909, 926 (2012) (observing that “news sources are full of stories about some
new mind-boggling scientific development” involving DNA typing. “Sadly, however, rev-
elations of laboratory malfeasance, errors, or sloppy mistakes are as common as stories
about the use of forensic science to convict a dangerous criminal or exonerate an innocent
accused.”).
27 Hibbert, 34 Wake Forest L Rev at 769 (cited in note 26).
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politicians.”28 Therefore, it was no surprise when states began to
extend DNA collection procedures to arrestees. In 2002, Virginia
became the first state to collect DNA from convicts and arrestees
when it passed a law requiring that DNA samples be taken from
those arrested for violent felonies. The Virginia Attorney General
explained that “[i]t’s no secret that an enhanced database increases
the chances of solving crimes,”29 and that database expansion “will
help us solve cases much quicker and ensure public safety by making
sure somebody’s not released back into the general public who has
committed a string of crimes.”30 Three years later, Congress enacted
a statute requiring that DNA samples be collected from all persons
arrested by federal officers, regardless of the nature of the crime
for which they are arrested.31 A year later, Congress made funding
available to the states to collect and analyze DNA samples obtained
from arrested individuals. In 2008, Maryland enacted the law at
issue in King, requiring the collection and testing of DNA from
persons arrested for serious felonies. Thus, when the Court agreed
to review the constitutionality of the Maryland statute, the case
attracted widespread attention. Twenty-four amicus briefs were filed
with the Court.
a. justice kennedy’s majority opinion
Alonzo King was arrested for assault on April 10, 2009, after
menacing a group of people with a shotgun. As a routine part of
the arrest procedure for a serious offense, Maryland law required
that a DNA sample be taken by applying a cotton swab to the
inside of King’s cheek.32 Under the law, a DNA sample may not
28 D. H. Kaye, Who Needs Special Needs? On the Constitutionality of Collecting DNA and
Other Biometric Data from Arrestees, 34 J L Med & Ethics 188 (2006); see generally D. H.
Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 Cornell J L & Pub Policy 455
(2001).
29 Ellen Sorokin, Attorney General Hopefuls Favor More DNA Collection, Washington
Times C1 (Aug 7, 2001).
30 Francis X. Clines, Virginia May Collect DNA in Every Arrest for a Felony, NY Times
22 (Feb 17, 2002).
31 42 USC § 14135a (a)(1)(A).
32 As Justice Kennedy noted, the statute authorizes collecting DNA samples from “‘an
individual who is charged with . . . a crime of violence or an attempt to commit a crime
of violence; or . . . burglary or an attempt to commit burglary.’” King, 133 S Ct at 1967,
quoting Md Pub Saf Code Ann § 2-504(a)(3)(i). The charge of first-degree assault was
eventually dismissed. King entered a plea pursuant to North Carolina v Alford, 400 US 25
(1970) (a defendant’s refusal to admit to guilt and professed belief in his innocence does
not bar a trial judge from accepting a guilty plea, particularly when the record provides
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be processed or placed in a database before the individual is ar-
raigned. King’s first court appearance was three days after his
arrest. King’s DNA sample was received by the Maryland State
Police’s Forensic Division two weeks after his arrest, on April 23,
2009. Several months later, on August 4, 2009, King’s DNA profile
was found to match the DNA discovered from an unsolved rape
committed in another Maryland city in 2003. After being charged
with that rape, King argued that the collection of his DNA after
his arrest for assault was an unreasonable search, and that the
evidence was therefore inadmissible in the rape trial. The trial
court rejected King’s suppression motion; he was convicted of rape
and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court
decided to weigh in.
Justice Kennedy began his analysis in King by observing that
“the framework for deciding the issue is well established.”33 Ac-
cording to Kennedy, the procedure constituted a Fourth Amend-
ment search, because the DNA sample taken from King entailed
the use of a buccal swab on the inner tissues of his cheek. Kennedy
explained that “[v]irtually any” intrusion into the body by state
officials triggers constitutional scrutiny.34 Kennedy then added,
however, that a “buccal swab is a far more gentle process than a
venipuncture to draw blood.”35 The “negligible” nature of the
intrusion, according to Kennedy, “is of central relevance to de-
termining the reasonableness” of the search.36
Kennedy explained that reasonableness in Fourth Amendment
cases depends on the circumstances of each case. For example,
warrants are required in some situations, but not in others. In-
dividualized suspicion of wrongdoing is generally “preferred” be-
fore police conduct a search, but there is no per se prohibition of
suspicionless intrusions.37 A search’s constitutionality is deter-
mined by evaluating law enforcement goals, the nature and mag-
nitude of the privacy interests at stake, the standardized nature of
a strong factual basis for the plea) and was convicted of second-degree assault, a misde-
meanor offense.
33 King, 133 S Ct at 1968.
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the search or seizure, and the extent of the intrusion on individual
privacy and dignity.38 Because the Maryland DNA collection law
applies to “all arrestees charged with serious crimes,” and because
police have no discretion when deciding whom to search, Kennedy
concluded that the buccal swab used to collect King’s DNA fell
within the “category of cases” calling for a balancing analysis—
weighing “the privacy-related and law enforcement-related con-
cerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable.”39
Turning first to the government’s side of the balance, Kennedy
argued that the government interest in King was the time-honored
need for police to “process and identify the persons and posses-
sions they must take into custody.”40 Kennedy argued that DNA
identification serves several governmental interests. In order of
importance, these interests include identifying the arrestee, pro-
tecting the safety and integrity of the detention facility that will
house the arrestee, ensuring that the arrestee will be available for
trial, enabling sound decisions about whether the arrestee should
be released on bail, and “freeing a person wrongfully imprisoned
for the same offense.”41 Although the Court listed five interests
served by DNA testing, only the first interest—identifying the
arrestee—is important for constitutional purposes. Indeed, the
Court did not place significant weight on the other four interests,
and for good reason. DNA testing takes at least several weeks to
perform. The time lag between the DNA search and test and the
receipt of matches prevents the arrestee’s sample from serving any
of the other interests identified by Justice Kennedy. An arrestee’s
DNA test is of no use to the state’s interests in protecting jailhouse
security and making accurate bail determinations, because these
matters arise long before an arrestee’s DNA results are available.
As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, “DNA testing does not even
begin until after arraignment and bail decisions are already made.
The samples sit in storage for months, and take weeks to test.”42
38 Id.
39 Id at 1970, quoting Illinois v McArthur, 531 US 326, 331 (2001).
40 King, 133 S Ct at 1970.
41 Id at 1970–74.
42 Id at 1986 (Scalia, J, dissenting). In an exchange between counsel for King and Chief
Justice Roberts during the oral argument, the Chief Justice seems to recognize the weak-
ness of the argument that DNA searches advance the state’s interest in accurate bail
determinations: “Now, your brief says, well, the only interest here is the law enforcement
interest. And I found that persuasive because of the concern that it’s going to take months
368 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [2013
Moreover, it is hardly self-evident that taking an arrestee’s DNA
deters flight before trial. Kennedy argued that if DNA is not taken
upon arrest, a “defendant who had committed a prior sexual assault
might be inclined to flee on a burglary charge, knowing that in
every State a DNA sample would be taken from him after his
conviction on the burglary charge that would tie him to the more
serious charge of rape,”43 but if a DNA sample is taken upon arrest,
the arrestee has little to gain by flight, because the police already
have his DNA. This logic is flawed, however, because an arrestee
who has his DNA taken upon arrest might also conclude he has
nothing to lose by flight, because he knows the government will
link him to the sexual assault. If anything, taking the DNA at the
time of arrest may actually increase the likelihood of flight.
Finally, the interest in exonerating those who have been wrong-
fully accused or convicted is mere window dressing for the ma-
jority’s argument. This is so because collecting DNA from arres-
tees cannot help vindicate the innocent.44 As Justice Scalia
observed in dissent in King, mandating collection of DNA from
arrestees for analysis against the FBI database cannot assist in
freeing wrongfully convicted persons, because the FBI database
includes DNA only from unsolved crimes. As Scalia sarcastically
noted: “I know of no indication (and the Court cites none) that
[the FBI database] also includes DNA from all—or even any—
crimes whose perpetrators have already been convicted.”45
to get the DNA back anyway, so they are going to have to release him or not before they
know it.” Oral Argument in King, at 42–43 (cited in note 18).
43 King, 133 S Ct at 1973.
44 In fact, Osborne v District Attorney’s Office, 557 US 52 (2009), “rejected a freestanding
due process right for prisoners to obtain DNA tests that might prove their innocence.”
Brandon. L. Garrett, Criminal Justice and the Court’s Past Term, Harvard University Press
Blog (Harvard University Press, Aug 2, 2013), online at http://harvardpress.typepad.com/
hup_publicity/2013/08/criminal-justice-and-the-courts-past-term-brandon-garrett.html.
To say the least, Osborne “is a striking contrast” to King’s “warm embrace of essentially
unlimited law enforcement use of DNA from mere arrestees.” Id. Professor Garrett also
states that “[n]o DNA exonerations have ever resulted from DNA collected from uncon-
victed arrestees, while many whose convictions were overturned have benefited from DNA
matches with serious convicts.”
45 King, 133 S Ct at 1984, n 2 (Scalia, J, dissenting). Compare Samuels et al, Collecting
DNA at Arrest at 8, n 8 (cited in note 14), quoting National DNA Database Submission to
the Home Affairs Committee at 2, Gene Watch UK (Jan 2010), online at http://
www.genewatch.org/uploads/f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/GWsub_Jan10.doc:
“‘although DNA can undoubtedly be useful to exonerate the innocent, a database of
individual DNA profiles (as opposed to crime scene profiles) is never necessary to exonerate
an innocent person, since this can always be done by comparing the DNA of the innocent
suspect directly with the crime scene DNA profile.’”). After King was announced, Barry
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With respect to the issue of identification, Justice Kennedy rea-
soned that law enforcement officials must know whom they have
arrested. “An individual’s identity is more than just his name or
Social Security number, and the government’s interest in identi-
fication goes beyond ensuring that the proper name is typed on
the indictment.”46 Kennedy observed that the identification pro-
cess includes “searching the public and police records based on
the identifying information provided by the arrestee to see what
is already known about him.”47 To this effect, an arrestee’s “crim-
inal history is a critical part of his identification that officers should
know when processing him for detention.”48 Moreover, DNA is
“an irrefutable identification”49 of the arrestee, and is even more
reliable as a type of identification than a photograph, social se-
curity number, or fingerprint. Kennedy therefore analogized tak-
ing a DNA sample to the practices and procedures police have
traditionally used in processing arrestees. It is similar to matching
an arrestee’s face to a photo of a previously unidentified suspect,
or “comparing tattoos to known gang symbols to reveal a criminal
affiliation; or matching the arrestee’s fingerprints to those recov-
ered from a crime scene.”50 Kennedy argued that “[ j]ust as fin-
gerprinting was constitutional for generations prior to the intro-
duction of [the FBI’s automated fingerprint identification system],
DNA identification of arrestees is a permissible tool of law en-
forcement today.”51 In Kennedy’s view, it makes no difference that
DNA analysis takes weeks or months to complete: “The question
of how long it takes to process identifying information obtained
from a valid search goes only to the efficacy of the search for its
purpose of prompt identification, not the constitutionality of the
search.”52 Kennedy therefore concluded that taking the DNA sam-
Scheck, a cofounder of the Innocence Project, told the New York Times that Justice Scalia’s
comment “goes too far.” Adam Liptak, Cited by a Justice, but Feeling Less Than Honored,
NY Times ( June 10, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/11/us/cited-by-
a-justice-but-feeling-less-than-honored.html?_rp0. Scheck told the Times that “there had
been times when prisoners had been exonerated through the testing of DNA in closed
cases.” Id.
46 King, 133 S Ct at 1971.
47 Id at 1972.
48 Id at 1971.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id at 1977.
52 Id at 1976 (citation omitted).
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ple served a legitimate and important law enforcement goal.
On the other side of the balance—King’s privacy interests—
Kennedy emphasized that the intrusion is “minimal” and that an
arrestee’s privacy expectations are curtailed by his lawful custody.53
Kennedy reasoned that DNA testing “differs from the sort of
programmatic searches of either the public at large or a particular
class of regulated but otherwise law-abiding citizens that the Court
has previously labeled as ‘special needs’ searches.”54 Although the
special needs cases “do not have a direct bearing on the issues
presented in” King because the taking of DNA from an arrestee
does not fall within that doctrine, Kennedy noted that searches
authorized by the Court’s special needs doctrine “intrude upon
substantial expectations of privacy.”55 Kennedy then stated, rather
curiously, that the Court’s special needs cases support his position
in King “because unlike the search of a citizen who has not been
suspected of a wrong, a detainee has a reduced expectation of
privacy.”56
Finally, Justice Kennedy argued that the manner of the search
itself raised no constitutional problems. The DNA obtained and
tested does not reveal the arrestee’s genetic traits, and even if the
DNA could provide some private genetic information, the state
analyzes the DNA sample for the sole purpose of generating a
unique identifying number against which future samples may be
matched. Kennedy left open whether law enforcement analysis of
samples to determine an arrestee’s predisposition for a particular
disease or other hereditary factor would be constitutional.57
b. justice scalia’s dissenting opinion
Justice Scalia’s acerbic dissent begins with a categorical rule:
“The Fourth Amendment forbids searching a person for evidence
of a crime when there is no basis for believing the person is guilty
of the crime or is in possession of incriminating evidence.”58 This
per se rule, according to Scalia, “lies at the very heart of the Fourth
53 Id at 1977–78.
54 Id at 1978.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id at 1979.
58 Id at 1980.
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Amendment.”59 Suspicionless searches, in Scalia’s view, are per-
missible only when the government is motivated by a concern
beyond the needs of ordinary law enforcement. Because the state
of Maryland had no basis for intruding into King’s body, the buccal
swab, no matter how brief and minimally intrusive, violated the
Fourth Amendment.
Regarding the government interest in identifying arrestees,
Scalia remarked that the Court’s “assertion that DNA is being
taken, not to solve crimes, but to identify those in the State’s
custody, taxes the credulity of the credulous.”60 The Court’s def-
inition of “identifying” is obviously wrong—“unless what one
means by ‘identifying’ someone is ‘searching for evidence that he
has committed crimes unrelated to the crime of his arrest.’”61 This
form of identification, according to Scalia, “is indistinguishable
from the ordinary law-enforcement aims that have never been
thought to justify a suspicionless search.”62 He observed sardon-
ically that searching cars of lawfully stopped drivers might reveal
information about unsolved crimes committed by the driver, “but
no one would say that such a search was aimed at ‘identifying’
him, and no court would hold such a search lawful.”63
Moreover, Scalia explained why the collection and testing of
King’s DNA was not intended to identify him. After King’s DNA
was taken by the police, it was eventually shipped to the FBI’s
DNA database. The FBI database contains two types of DNA
collections: DNA samples taken from known convicts and arrestees,
and DNA samples found at crime scenes belonging to unknown
persons or perpetrators. At the FBI laboratory, King’s DNA profile
was compared with the DNA profiles of the second group. The
purpose of this comparison was not to determine King’s identity,
but to determine whether King’s DNA profile matched any of the
DNA profiles found at scenes of unsolved crimes, such as the 2003
rape. If Maryland had wanted to identify King, “the logical thing
to do” would have been to compare his DNA against the first
group—known convicts and arrestees.64 As Scalia observed, Mary-
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id at 1983.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id at 1985.
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land did not do this, because it already knew who King was and
“because this search had nothing to with identification.”65
Finally, Scalia pointed out that Maryland’s DNA law itself does
not support the “identification” purpose attributed to it by the
Court. According to Scalia, the relevant section of the statute
specifies the purpose behind the DNA searches: samples are tested
“‘as part of an official investigation into a crime.’”66 By contrast,
another section of the statute permits testing for identification
purposes: “‘to help identify human remains,’” and “‘to help identify
missing individuals.’”67 No section of the statute authorizes DNA
testing for the purpose of identifying arrestees. Moreover, another
section of the law expressly prohibits using DNA samples “for any
purposes other than those specified” in the statute.68
Justice Scalia was not persuaded by the Court’s claim that DNA
testing is indistinguishable from traditional procedures used to
process and identify arrestees. Scalia noted that photographing an
arrestee does not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny because tak-
ing a photograph is not a physical intrusion, nor does it implicate
a legitimate expectation of privacy. Additionally, Scalia observed
that the Court’s precedents “provide no ready answer” as to
whether fingerprinting constitutes a search.69 But even assuming
that fingerprinting is a search, “[f ]ingerprints of arrestees are taken
primarily to identify them (though that process sometimes solves
crimes); the DNA of arrestees is taken to solve crimes (and nothing
else).”70 Regarding the constitutional status of fingerprinting,
Scalia rightly noted that the Court’s claim that fingerprinting has
been “constitutional for generations” is “bereft of citation to au-
thority because there is none for it.”71 Scalia observed that the fact
that many Americans have apparently accepted fingerprinting in
various contexts is not the equivalent of the Court’s imprimatur.
In his view, it is “wrong” to imply that fingerprinting has always
been “uncontroversial,” or to suggest “that this Court blessed uni-
65 Id.
66 Id, quoting Md Pub Saf Code Ann § 2-505(a)(2).
67 King, 133 S Ct at 1986, quoting Md Pub Saf Code Ann § 2-505(a)(3) & (a)(4) (emphasis
in original).
68 King, 133 S Ct at 1986, quoting Md Pub Saf Code Ann § 2-505 (b)(2).
69 King, 133 S Ct at 1987.
70 Id.
71 Id at 1988.
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versal fingerprinting for ‘generations’ before it was possible to use
it effectively for identification.”72
Scalia might have added that fingerprinting arrestees has not
always received the approval of the judiciary. As Professor Wayne
Logan has explained, fingerprinting gained prominence in the
early part of the twentieth century, “and by the 1930s fingerprint-
ing was the nation’s criminal-identification method of choice.”73
The judiciary, however, imposed limits on the use of fingerprints,
especially when prints were obtained from persons not convicted
of crimes.74 A crucial change in the judiciary’s acceptance of the
routine use of fingerprinting occurred in United States v Kelly, when
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected
a challenge to the use of fingerprints to confirm a suspect’s iden-
tity.75 Kelly’s holding, however, was “predicated on the need to
verify identity, and was decided well before the forensic investi-
gative heyday of prints, allowing for digitized matches to ‘latent’
prints found at a crime scene or stored in databases.”76 Even with
Kelly on the books, “the constitutional propriety of identity ver-
ification methods at the pre-conviction stage has always merely
been ‘assume[d].’”77
Comparing fingerprinting to DNA profiling is problematic for
another reason. Fingerprints are “useful only as a form of iden-
tification.”78 They cannot be analyzed, for example, “to determine
whether two individuals are related.”79 By contrast, “[e]ven non-
coding regions of the DNA transmit more information than a
standard fingerprint.”80 Although the noncoding regions of DNA
used to create DNA identification profiles “may never be found
to have highly sensitive direct coding functions, they may very
72 Id.
73 Wayne A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 BU L Rev 1561, 1574 (2012) (footnote omitted).
74 Id at 1583 (fingerprints were “as a general rule, collected and stored only in the event
of conviction”).
75 United States v Kelly, 55 F2d 67 (2d Cir 1932).
76 Logan, 92 BU L Rev at 1583 (footnotes omitted) (cited in note 73).
77 Id at 1584 (footnote omitted; bracket in original).
78 Sheldon Krimsky and Tania Simoncelli, Genetic Justice: DNA Data Banks, Criminal
Investigations, and Civil Liberties 235 (Columbia, 2011).
79 Id.
80 Id at 236.
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well be found to correlate with things we may care about and deem
private.”81
Scalia also criticized the Court’s willingness to accept the claim
that the government is developing technology that will analyze
DNA samples in “mere minutes.”82 Although conceding that there
may come a day when it is possible to analyze DNA samples
instantaneously, Scalia correctly observed that “[t]he issue before
us is not whether DNA can some day be used for identification;
nor even whether it can today be used for identification; but
whether it was used for identification here.”83
Finally, Scalia predicted that the search approved in King will
not be confined to those arrested for violent felonies. “I cannot
imagine what principle could possibly justify this limitation, and
the Court does not attempt to suggest any.”84 Thus, Scalia envi-
sions a future where every person’s DNA will be taken and tested
upon arrest, whether they are arrested for a traffic violation or an
illegal political protest. “If one believes that DNA will ‘identify’
someone arrested for assault, he must believe that it will ‘identify’
someone arrested for a traffic offense. This Court does not base
its judgments on senseless distinctions.”85 Tellingly, Justice Ken-
nedy offered no reply to Justice Scalia’s dissent.86
81 Id.
82 King, 133 S Ct at 1988.
83 Id at 1988–89. There may soon come a day when technology allows the police to
instantaneously analyze an arrestee’s DNA sample and determine whether it matches the
DNA found at the crime scene of an unresolved murder or rape. Under Justice Kennedy’s
analysis in King, however, the speed of obtaining test results “goes only to the efficacy of
the search . . . , not the constitutionality of the search.” Id at 1976. In any event, instan-
taneous analysis should not change the Fourth Amendment judgment. Even if police obtain
immediate results from a DNA test, this test still occurs by means of a physical intrusion,
conducted without suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, and motivated by law enforcement
interests. The only difference between the situation in King and a case involving instan-
taneous analysis is the speed with which police have access to the fruit of their search. If
future technology gives the police the ability to instantaneously discover the contents of
a home, contraband and noncontraband items alike, the search remains unreasonable even
when the results are instantaneous. See Kyllo v United States, 533 US 27, 34 (2001) (“We
think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior
of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area’ constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the tech-
nology in question is not in general public use.”). The same logic applies when the search
involves a person.
84 King, 133 S Ct at 1989.
85 Id.
86 See also Lyle Denniston, Opinion Recap: Solving “Cold Cases” Made Easier, SCOTUS-
blog ( June 3, 2013), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/opinion-recap-solv-
ing-cold-cases-made-easier/ (“The Kennedy and Scalia opinions were almost totally at
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II. A Decision Without Precedent
As one chronicler of the Court has observed, Justice Ken-
nedy’s opinion in King “sought to make it appear that the outcome
was easily reached and involved no real alteration of existing con-
stitutional norms.”87 In fact, the Court’s most relevant precedents
support the opposite conclusion.88
a. dna sampling cannot be justified as a search incident to
arrest
Certainly, the Court’s search incident to arrest precedents do
not support the decision in King. During the oral argument, Justice
Kennedy compared taking a DNA sample to the search of an
arrestee’s coat pocket, the type of search upheld in United States
v Robinson.89 But the Court’s search incident to arrest rulings do
not come close to authorizing a search into an arrestee’s body.90
Although Kennedy quoted Robinson91 and Florence v Board of Chosen
Freeholders92 for the proposition that “[a] search of the detainee’s
person when he is booked into custody may ‘involve a relatively
extensive exploration,’ including ‘requir[ing] at least some detain-
ees to lift their genitals or cough in a squatting position,’”93 Justice
odds with each other, in tone and in substance. . . . [Kennedy] also made no effort to
respond to the dissenting opinion.”).
87 Id.
88 Although Justice Kennedy would not concede the point in his opinion, Deputy So-
licitor General Michael Dreeben acknowledged during oral argument that “there is no
case on my side that decides the case” for the government, while quickly adding “there’s
no case that—on [King’s] side that decides the case for him.” Oral Argument in King, at
24–25 (cited in note 18). The Chief Deputy Attorney General for Maryland made a similar
concession: “. . . [T]here’s no—there’s no case in this Court’s jurisprudence that’s exactly
like this.” Id at 12.
89 Id at 26. Kennedy noted: “Just—just like taking the pockets out and—seeing what’s
in the person’s overcoat and so forth is a search incident to arrest.”
90 Justice Rehnquist recognized in Robinson that “virtually all of the statements of this
Court affirming the existence of an unqualified authority to search incident to a lawful
arrest are dicta.” Robinson, 414 US at 230. See also LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure § 5.2(b)
at 136 (cited in note 3) (noting that “neither the prior decisions of the Supreme Court
nor the ‘original understanding’ evidence [regarding the Fourth Amendment] conclusively
establishes whether the ‘general authority’ to search the person incident to arrest is ‘un-
qualified.’”).
91 “‘The validity of the search of a person incident to a lawful arrest has been regarded
as settled from its first enunciation, and has remained virtually unchallenged.’” King, 133
S Ct at 1970–71, quoting Robinson, 414 US at 224.
92 Florence v Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 132 S Ct 1510 (2012).
93 King, 133 S Ct at 1978, quoting Robinson, 414 US at 227, and Florence, 132 S Ct at
1520.
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Scalia correctly responded that “[t]he objects of a search incident
to arrest must be either (1) weapons or evidence that might easily
be destroyed, or (2) evidence relevant to the crime of arrest. Nei-
ther is the object of the search at issue here.”94 Indeed, none of
the Court’s search incident to arrest rulings since Chimel v Cali-
fornia95 permit a suspicionless search for ordinary crime-solving
or identification purposes.96 Robinson certainly did not approve
such a search, because a weapon such as a razor blade might have
been inside the cigarette package. Moreover, none of the Court’s
decisions, old or new, have ever authorized suspicionless searches
into the bodies of arrestees. To the contrary, the Court in Schmerber
expressly foreclosed such searches when it explained that the ra-
tionale of search incident to arrest has “little applicability with
respect to searches involving intrusions beyond the body’s sur-
face.”97
Perhaps Kennedy cited Robinson and other search incident to
arrest rulings merely to establish that arrestees possess a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy while in custody. Kennedy conceded
that a warrant would be required to perform surgery on King or
to search his home, notwithstanding his diminished privacy in-
terests as an arrestee. As the Court noted in Schmerber, logic dic-
tates that “absent an emergency, no less could be required where
intrusions into the human body are concerned.”98 Put simply, the
Court’s search incident to arrest precedents do not authorize bod-
ily intrusions. Because there was no emergency, judicial authori-
94 King, 133 S Ct at 1982 (Scalia, J, dissenting) (citations omitted).
95 Chimel, 395 US 752.
96 Compare Brandon L. Garrett and Erin Murphy, Supreme Court 2013: Collecting DNA
from People Who Are Arrested Won’t Solve More Crimes, Slate Magazine (Feb 12, 2013),
available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/02/dna
_collection_at_the_supreme_court_maryland_v_king.html (“the Supreme Court has never
held that if police have probable cause to arrest, they can also search a suspect for evidence
of past or future crimes”); Sandra J. Carnahan, The Supreme Court’s Primary Purpose Test:
A Roadblock to the National Law Enforcement DNA Database, 83 Neb L Rev 1, 35 (2004)
(“The Supreme Court has never approved a suspicionless search involving bodily intrusion
for a law enforcement purpose, and to do so [for a national law enforcement DNA database
for convicts] would be a substantial departure from traditional Fourth Amendment prin-
ciples.”). But compare Kerr, A Few Thoughts (cited in note 15) (“in light of the broad
language of Robinson’s holding, “it seems wrong, based on current law, to say that a
suspicionless search is never allowed incident to arrest for purposes of ordinary crime-
solving.”)
97 Schmerber, 384 US at 769.
98 Id at 770.
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zation, or probable cause for the search, the buccal swab was an
“unreasonable” search.
The Court’s precedents also suggest that a second search oc-
curred when King’s DNA was subjected to forensic analysis. In
Ferguson v Charleston, the Court found that “urine tests conducted
by [state actors] were indisputably searches within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.”99 Ferguson’s conclusion rested on the
legal principle established twelve years earlier in Justice Kennedy’s
opinion for the Court in Skinner v Railway Labor Executives’ As-
sociation.100 Skinner addressed whether obtaining and testing blood
and breath samples from railroad personnel who were involved in
train accidents, or who violated certain safety rules, constituted
searches. After concluding that collecting the samples was a search,
the Court added that chemical analysis of the samples “to obtain
physiological data is a further invasion of the tested employee’s
privacy interests.”101 Skinner explained that, although collecting
and testing urine samples does not require a bodily intrusion,
“chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host
of private medical facts about an employee, including whether she
is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.”102
In King, Justice Kennedy rejected the claim that the processing
of King’s DNA sample violated the Constitution, arguing that,
because “the CODIS loci come from noncoding parts of the DNA
that do not reveal the genetic traits of the arrestee,”103 it was “open
to dispute” whether “the testing . . . in this case reveals any private
medical information.”104 The implication is that analysis of DNA
samples does not infringe any privacy interest. This conclusion
also means that when police obtain a DNA sample without a per-
99 Ferguson v Charleston, 532 US 67, 76 (2001). Justice Scalia’s dissent in Ferguson ques-
tioned whether obtaining and testing urine samples of hospital patients triggered Fourth
Amendment scrutiny. “There is only one act that could conceivably be regarded as a search
of petitioners in the present case: the taking of the urine sample. I suppose the testing of
that urine for traces of unlawful drugs could be considered a search of sorts, but the Fourth
Amendment protects only against searches of citizens’ ‘persons, houses, papers and effects’;
and it is entirely unrealistic to regard urine as one of the ‘effects’ (i.e., part of the property)
of the person who has passed and abandoned it.”). Id at 92 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
100 Skinner v Railway Labor Executives’ Assn, 489 US 602 (1989).
101 Id at 616.
102 Id at 617. Thus, collecting and testing urine also “must be deemed searches under
the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
103 King, 133 S Ct at 1979.
104 Id.
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son’s knowledge, say, from a discarded cigarette butt or water
bottle, analysis of the sample does not trigger the Fourth Amend-
ment at all.105 This understanding is predicated on the assumption
that the end product of analysis—the DNA profile—does not re-
veal genetic information about the individual. However, this as-
sumption ignores the real threat to privacy posed by DNA data
banking: ”[T]he chance for government officials to surpass their
[statutory] authority and use our DNA samples, containing our
full genome and a ‘treasure map’ of our sensitive genetic infor-
mation, for nefarious purposes.”106
In addition to emphasizing the arrestee’s diminished expectation
of privacy, Justice Kennedy also stressed the trifling nature of the
cheek swab. This description of King’s constitutional interest is
“especially problematic; King complained about the information
taken from him, not the Q-tip in his mouth.”107 More importantly,
Kennedy ignored the Court’s precedents. The minimal character
of the intrusion should not matter. In Arizona v Hicks, police en-
tered Hicks’s home in response to a call that a gun had been fired
through Hicks’s apartment floor, injuring a man in the unit be-
low.108 While police were lawfully in the apartment searching for
the shooter and any other victims, they noticed two sets of stereo
equipment they suspected were stolen.109 The police recorded the
serial numbers, which required moving some of the equipment,
and seized the equipment after learning that it had been stolen.110
The Court found that police action (i.e., slightly moving stereo
equipment to see the serial number) unrelated to the objectives
of the lawful search constituted a separate and distinct invasion
of the suspect’s privacy that was unjustified by the exigency of the
lawful police entry. Hicks explained:
105 For an excellent discussion of some of the legal issues surrounding the government’s
collection of “abandoned DNA,” see Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The
Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 Nw U L Rev 857 (2006).
106 Andrea Roth, Maryland v. King and the Wonderful, Horrible DNA Revolution in Law
Enforcement, 11 Ohio St J Crim L 295, 303 (2013). See also Krimsky and Simoncelli,
Genetic Justice at 235–36 (cited in note 78) (“DNA samples, which are stored indefinitely
by forensic laboratories . . . have the potential to reveal almost unlimited information”
about individuals.).
107 Elizabeth E. Joh, Maryland v. King: Policing and Genetic Privacy, 11 Ohio St J Crim
L 281, 287 (2013).
108 Arizona v Hicks, 480 US 321 (1987).
109 Id at 323.
110 Id at 323–24.
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It matters not that the search uncovered nothing of any great personal
value to [the suspect]—serial numbers rather than (what might con-
ceivably have been hidden behind or under the equipment) letters or
photographs. A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing
but the bottom of a turntable.111
If moving a turntable a few inches requires probable cause under
the Court’s precedents, so should a compelled police entry into a
person’s mouth.
Moreover, the Court in Schmerber described extraction of blood
samples as a “common-place” procedure that “involves virtually
no risk, trauma, or pain.”112 Since then, many courts have described
a compelled blood extraction as a painless, routine procedure.113
In fact, Justice Kennedy cited Schmerber and other precedents in
a 1989 ruling to confirm “‘society’s judgment that blood tests do
not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an individual’s
privacy and bodily integrity.’”114 Nonetheless, the Court has never
disavowed Schmerber’s judgment regarding the need for a warrant
when the police want to draw blood from an arrestee. Indeed, in
Missouri v McNeely, decided only six weeks before King, the Court
reaffirmed Schmerber and rejected the state’s call for a per se rule
allowing warrantless blood testing in drunk-driving cases.115 Put
simply, bodily intrusions by the police, no matter how painless or
commonplace, have always required a showing of probable cause
and a warrant.
b. dna sampling cannot be justified under the special
needs exception
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in King appears to draw on the
Court’s special needs cases. For example, Kennedy invoked Veronia
School District 47J v Acton to support the balancing analysis he
employs,116 Treasury Employees v Von Raab to bolster his conclusion
111 Id at 325.
112 Schmerber, 384 US at 771.
113 See, for example, United States v Amerson, 483 F3d 73, 84 (2d Cir 2007) (noting that
the Court “has long maintained that the intrusion effected by taking a blood sample . . .
is minimal.”), quoting Nicholas v Goord, 432 F3d 652, 659 (2d Cir 2005).
114 Skinner v Ry. Labor Executives’ Assn, 489 US 602, 625 (1989), quoting Winston v Lee,
470 US 753, 762 (1985).
115 Missouri v McNeely, 133 S Ct 1552, 1554 (2013).
116 King, 133 S Ct at 1969, quoting Vernonia School Dist. 47J v Acton, 515 US 646, 652
(1995) (“As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the
constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness’”).
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that warrants are not required “when the search involves no dis-
cretion that could be properly limited by the ‘interpo[lation of] a
neutral magistrate between the citizen and the law enforcement
officer,’”117 and several other special needs cases to support the
proposition that an arrestee’s privacy interests must be assessed in
light of his “‘legal relationship with the State.’”118 In these cases,
the Court has permitted suspicionless searches of individuals
117 King, 133 S Ct at 1969–70, quoting Treasury Employees v Von Raab, 489 US 656, 667
(1989). Of course, the assertion that collecting DNA from arrestees involves “no [police]
discretion” is ridiculous. Professor Erin Murphy rightly notes that the “notion that arrestee
testing invites no law enforcement discretion makes sense only if one believes that the
police lack discretion in making decisions about arrest.” Murphy, 127 Harv L Rev at 189
(cited in note 16) (footnote omitted). Even the Court knows this isn’t true. See Town of
Castle Rock, Colorado v Gonzales, 545 US 748, 760 (2005) (“A well-established tradition of
police discretion has long coexisted with apparently mandatory arrest statutes.”). Many
scholars have shown that the decision to arrest can be highly discretionary. See, for ex-
ample, Wayne R. LaFave, Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody 60 (Brown,
1965) (“It is not common to arrest a person unless he is at least suspected of having
engaged in criminal conduct. It is common for some persons not to be arrested even
though it can easily be proved that they have engaged in criminal conduct.”); id at 155
(“A decision not to arrest in a specific case does not ordinarily come to the attention of
members of the community. . . . In most situations, the decision is known only to those
who know of the crime and to the police officer who decides not to arrest.”); Michael K.
Brown, Working the Street: Police Discretion and the Dilemmas of Reform at 152 (Rose Sage
Foundation, 1988) (stating that “felonies are the least interesting of discretionary incidents,
for these violations are usually enforced. Refusal to arrest a person who has committed a
felony not only counters the police code, but many policemen believe they have no dis-
cretion where a felony is concerned. This does not mean that every person who commits
a felony will be arrested, since the determination of whether or not a felony has been
committed is often a matter of interpretation.”). Police exercise even greater discretion
regarding misdemeanor arrests. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S Cal L Rev
1313, 1331–37 (2012) (“police arrest people for a variety of reasons that may or may not
involve probable cause”); id at 1337 (“while we do not know how many people are arrested
for petty offenses without evidence, we know the practice is ingrained in phenomena like
urban loitering and trespass policies, zero tolerance policing, and routine urban street
control. . . . Because misdemeanor arrests are low profile, unlikely to be litigated, and
staples of police control tactics, they can easily be driven not by evidence, but by other
police aims and goals.”); see also Logan, 92 BU L Rev 1561 at 1589–90 (cited in note
73) (discussing the discretion police have when making arrests). Thus, even Professor
David Kaye, an advocate for universal DNA testing, recognizes that “making arrest the
threshold for inclusion in law enforcement DNA databases reflects a naı̈ve view of what
it means to be arrested. . . . Indeed, probable cause to arrest is spread thick and wide
through the populace, attaching to the innocent-in-fact as well as to those guilty of the
crime for which probable cause exists. Probable cause is thus an extremely low threshold,
and a poor shield against the government taking and profiling our DNA—and against
abuse of that power.” D. H. Kaye and Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases:
Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 Wis L Rev 413, 458
n 153 (2003). See also Joh, 11 Ohio St J Crim L at 285 (cited in note 107) (“What King
fails to acknowledge is that the very existence of a DNA database gives the police incentives
to turn every encounter into an arrest. . . . While it is true that database laws give the
police few choices at the literal moment of sample collection, little reins in the police in
their decision about whom to target, when, and why” (footnotes omitted).
118 King, 133 S Ct at 1978, quoting Vernonia, 515 US at 654.
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“when ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforce-
ment, make the warrant and probable cause requirement imprac-
ticable.’”119 A synthesis of the cases shows that three factors are
important to the Court when it decides whether a challenged
search falls within the special needs doctrine: the purpose of the
search, whether law enforcement officials will have access to the
fruits of the search, and the extent of police involvement in con-
ducting the search.120
Several lower courts have upheld DNA testing of arrestees on
the theory that the testing is reasonable both for immediate iden-
tification purposes and for “maintaining a permanent record to
solve other past and future crimes.”121 This reasoning, however,
cannot be squared with legal principles announced in the Court’s
most recent special needs case, Ferguson v City of Charleston.122 In
Ferguson, the Court invalidated a public hospital’s policy of con-
ducting urine tests of pregnant women suspected of drug use and
disclosing the results to law enforcement officials. Writing for the
Court, Justice Stevens explained that the urine tests were designed
to obtain incriminating information that would be revealed to
police and prosecutors. Because the urine tests’ central purpose
“was to use the threat of arrest and prosecution in order to force
women into treatment, and given the extensive involvement of law
enforcement officials at every stage of the policy,”123 the Court
found that “this case simply does not fit within the closely guarded
category of ‘special needs.’”124 Stevens explained that the “fact that
positive test results were turned over to the police does not merely
provide a basis for distinguishing” the special needs cases, it “also
provides an affirmative reason for enforcing the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment.”125 Stevens added that, “[w]hile the ultimate
goal of the policy may well have been to get [women] into sub-
119 Griffin v Wisconsin, 483 US 868, 873 (1987), quoting New Jersey v T.L.O., 469 US
325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J, concurring).
120 See Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee’s DNA a Valid Special Needs Search Under
the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will ) the Supreme Court Do? 33 J L Med &
Ethics 102, 108–15 (2005).
121 Anderson v Commonwealth, 634 SE2d 372, 375 (Va App 2006), quoting Jones v Murray,
962 F2d 302, 306 (4th Cir 1992).
122 Ferguson v City of Charleston, 532 US 67 (2001).
123 Id at 84.
124 Id (footnote omitted).
125 Id.
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stance abuse treatment and off of drugs, the immediate objective
of the searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement pur-
poses in order to reach that goal.”126 For that reason, the special
needs doctrine was inapplicable.
In light of Ferguson, it is difficult to conclude that DNA testing
of an arrestee is a valid special needs search. Although the gov-
ernment has legitimate interests in knowing the identity of ar-
restees and in accurately identifying arrestees in a manner superior
to fingerprinting or photography, it does not follow that DNA
testing falls within the special needs doctrine because the govern-
ment’s interests in this context are directly related to law enforce-
ment.127 Further, police are thoroughly involved in conducting and
using the results of DNA searches. As Justice Kennedy observed
in his concurring opinion in Ferguson, “[n]one of our special needs
precedents has sanctioned the routine inclusion of law enforce-
ment . . . to implement the system designed for the special needs
objectives.”128
It might be argued that because the police are permitted to
fingerprint arrestees for administrative purposes related to “iden-
tification” and to use those fingerprints for investigative purposes,
the same should be true for DNA searches. This is a false analogy,
however. As David Kaye, a well-known proponent of universal
DNA testing, noted in the aftermath of Ferguson, it is “extremely
implausible” that taking DNA samples from arrestees can be jus-
tified on the theory that the search’s primary purpose is to as-
certain an arrestee’s true identity.129 Rather, “[t]he legislative in-
terest in DNA databases has not been primarily to supplement or
supplant fingerprints as markers of true identity; it has always been
to generate investigative leads.”130 For all these reasons, DNA
126 Id at 82–83 (footnotes omitted).
127 Compare Kaye and Smith, 2003 Wis L Rev at 434 (cited in note 117) (“‘Normal
law enforcement’ would appear to be the primary purpose of a program requiring arrestees
to provide DNA samples, typing those samples at standard forensic loci, and including
the profiles in an identification database that can be searched for a profile matching DNA
recovered in connection with unsolved past or future crime.”).
128 Ferguson, 532 US at 88 (Kennedy, J, concurring).
129 D. H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks for Law Enforcement, 67 Brooklyn
L Rev 176, 203 (2001).
130 Id; compare Kaye, 34 J L Med & Ethics at 192 (cited in note 28) (stating that the
reasoning of Ferguson “has pulled the rug out from under special-needs balancing for DNA
databanks. The convicted-offender databases exist primarily to facilitate the identification
of the perpetrators of sexual assaults, murders, and many other crimes, . . . criminal
investigation is their raison d’etre.”).
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testing of arrestees does not fit within the category of special needs
cases.
c. dna sampling cannot be justified under the samson/
knights principle
If DNA testing is justified neither as a search incident to arrest
nor as a special needs search, how can it be squared with the Fourth
Amendment? As one federal appellate court has observed, the “Su-
preme Court has never applied a general balancing test”131 in the
context of searches designed to investigate ordinary criminal con-
duct. Indeed, as Justice Scalia emphasized in his dissenting opinion
in King, the Court has generally embraced a “categorical” rule that
the Fourth Amendment bars “searching a person for evidence of
a crime when there is no basis for believing the person is guilty
of the crime or is in possession of incriminating evidence.”132
The “categorical” rule was jostled a bit, however, in United States
v Knights133 and Samson v California.134 Both cases cast doubt on
this “rule.” In 2001, the Court in Knights upheld a warrantless
police search of a probationer’s home based on reasonable sus-
picion that criminal evidence would be discovered. Knights did not
rely upon the special needs doctrine, because the search was di-
rectly related to law enforcement purposes and conducted by po-
lice. Additionally, there was no exigency justifying the warrantless
search of Knights’s home. The Court held that the search was
“reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment approach of
‘examining the totality of the circumstances.’”135 The Court em-
phasized that Knights had signed a probation order that permitted
suspicionless searches of his person, property, and effects “at any-
time.”136 This agreement, although not determinative of Knights’s
Fourth Amendment rights, “significantly diminished” his “rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.”137 The Court concluded that the
131 Nicholas v Goord, 430 F3d at 666.
132 King, 133 S Ct at 1980.
133 United States v Knights, 534 US 112 (2001). Professor LaFave is quite critical of
Knights. See LaFave, 5 Search and Seizure § 10.10(c) at 542–46 (cited in note 3).
134 Samson v California, 547 US 843 (2006).
135 Knights, 534 US at 118.
136 Id at 114.
137 Id at 120 (footnote omitted). Although Knights’s holding incorporates the reasonable
suspicion the police had for searching Knights, the statute governing the search permitted
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warrantless search of Knights’s home advanced the government’s
“justified” concern in protecting the community from criminal acts
committed by a probationer, who “will be more likely to engage
in criminal conduct than an ordinary member of the commu-
nity.”138
Samson went a step further and upheld a suspicionless police
search of a known parolee seen walking down the street with a
woman and a child. The officer testified that he searched Samson’s
person for the “sole reason . . . that defendant was ‘on parole,’”
and noted that he “does not search all parolees ‘all the time,’ but
does conduct parole searches ‘on a regular basis’ unless he has
‘other work to do’ or already ‘dealt with’ the parolee.”139 Like
Knights, Samson had signed a release condition which permitted
suspicionless searches at any time of the day or night. According
to the Court, the issue in Samson was whether the condition of
parole can so diminish a parolee’s reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy that a suspicionless search by police does not violate the
Fourth Amendment. In a 6–3 ruling (with Justice Scalia in the
majority), the Court held that the search was “reasonable,” once
again suggesting the propriety of an open-ended type of balancing.
The Court emphasized that Samson had signed a search condition
that diminished any reasonable expectation of privacy he might
otherwise harbor. For good measure, the Court added that pro-
bationers and parolees are on a “‘continuum’ of state-imposed
punishments” and that “[o]n this continuum, parolees have fewer
expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more
akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.”140 The
Court found that the suspicionless search served several state in-
terests, including reducing recidivism of parolees, supervising pa-
rolees, and protecting the public from criminal acts by reoffenders.
In practical effect, Samson eliminated Fourth Amendment protec-
suspicionless searches of probationers, a fact not lost on the Knights majority. Id at 120,
n 6. Indeed, the Court seemed to plant the seeds for the result in Samson in Knights when
it explicitly left open “whether [a] probation condition so diminished, or completely elim-
inated, Knights’ reasonable expectation of privacy . . . that a search by a law enforcement
officer without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied the reasonableness re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Id (emphasis added).
138 Knights, 534 US at 121.
139 Samson, 547 US at 843.
140 Id.
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tion for parolees, though the Court denied this result.141
According to Professor Wayne LaFave, Samson is the most rel-
evant precedent in assessing the constitutionality of arrestee DNA
testing.142 It is, indeed, the only modern precedent in which the
Court has upheld a suspicionless search for investigative purposes
under a standardless balancing analysis.143 Interestingly, though
Justice Kennedy could have cited Knights and Samson as direct
support for the result in King, he did not.144 Perhaps Kennedy
avoided relying upon either Knights or Samson because Knights and
Samson apply only to searches of persons who have already been
convicted of crime. During the oral argument, Kennedy seemed
141 Justice Thomas’s majority ruling in Samson denied the charge in Justice Stevens’s
dissent that the result in Samson permitted arbitrary, capricious, or harassing searches of
parolees. According to Thomas, a statutory prohibition against these types of searches
prevented that result. Samson, 547 US at 856. Justice Thomas’s statement is unconvincing.
If the statutory prohibition had any teeth, why wasn’t the search of Samson deemed
“arbitrary”? Is there much difference “between a search made without suspicion (and
without adherence to any neutral criteria) and one made in an arbitrary or capricious
manner?” Yale Kamisar et al, Modern Criminal Procedure 451 (West, 13th ed 2012). The
officer’s testimony—he searched Samson for the “sole reason . . . that defendant was ‘on
parole’”—suggested that the search was arbitrary. In any event, when the result in Samson
is paired with the holding in Pa Bd of Probation and Parole v Scott, 524 US 357 (1998)
(Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule does not apply in a state parole hearing to suppress
the fruit of an unconstitutional search conducted against a parolee), Fourth Amendment
protection for parolees seems nonexistent.
142 According to LaFave, none of the Justices in King measured DNA testing of arrestees
by the “one and only suspicionless-search/no-special-needs/balancing-of-interests prece-
dent, Samson v. California.” Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 5.4(c) (forthcoming, West, 5th ed supp 2013–14).
143 Compare Charles J. Nerko, Note, Assessing Fourth Amendment Challenges to DNA
Extraction Statutes After Samson v California, 77 Fordham L Rev 917, 945 (2008) (noting
that although the Samson Court “described its decision as ‘far from remarkable,’ never
before had the Court approbated a search devoid of a warrant or individualized suspicion
by invoking the totality of the circumstances test.”); id at 945 (stating that “Samson provides
courts with a new Fourth Amendment approach to justify the monumental governmental
interests” that DNA testing of convicts furthers) (emphasis added); see also LaFave, 3
Search and Seizure § 5.4(c) (supp 2013–14) (cited in note 142) (“What makes King so
disappointing is neither opinion comes to grips with the real issue in the case”—namely,
“whether on a balancing-of-interests analysis a standardized procedure—consisting of a
suspicionless minimal search by way of a cheek swab to obtain DNA for the primary
purpose of identifying the perpetrators of otherwise unsolved past and future crimes—
may constitutionally be applied to all persons lawfully arrested and then held pursuant to
a valid charge of a serious offense, in light of the reduced expectation of privacy of those
detainees.”).
144 See LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure § 5.4(c) (supp 2013–14) (cited in note 142) (noting
that the result in King, as intimated by the Court majority, comes from a “process of
balancing privacy and law enforcement interests in cases where there exists a lesser-ex-
pectation-of-privacy than is normally the case, which the majority could have specified
(but didn’t) as having been accepted by a majority of the Court” in Knights and Samson).
386 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [2013
to accept that position.145 Because parolees and probationers could
be in prison and thus subject to frequent and suspicionless
searches,146 it might seem reasonable for the government to release
them on the condition that they remain subject to similar
searches.147 On this view, arrestees are distinguishable, because
they have not been placed on a “‘continuum’ of state-imposed
punishments.”148
In sum, then, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in King cannot per-
suasively be explained in terms of the Knights/Samson principle,
the search incident to arrest doctrine, or the special needs concept.
What, then, explains King’s holding? In the end, King appears to
rest on the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of open-ended in-
terest balancing, and this will likely portend how King will be read
in the future. As Terry v Ohio and its progeny have shown, such
an approach is an open invitation to expansive police powers.
III. Implications of King
King’s application in future cases depends on how one reads
Justice Kennedy’s opinion. King can be read narrowly to apply
only to persons arrested on felony or other serious charges. Ken-
nedy himself framed the issue in that way, asking only whether
the Fourth Amendment bars DNA testing from “persons arrested
. . . on felony charges.”149 As Justice Scalia noted in dissent, at
145 When counsel for King noted his strong disagreement with Maryland and the federal
government’s argument to use the “rationale of Samson v. California and essentially extend
that rationale to the point of arrest,” Justice Kennedy responded: “I think—I think there
is some merit to your argument in that regard. In Samson, he was a parolee, and he actually,
as I recall, signed a—a consent form as part of the probation.” Oral Argument in King at
30 (cited in note 18).
146 Hudson v Palmer, 468 US 517 (1984) (ruling that the Fourth Amendment does not
provide protection for claims that a convicted prisoner has a privacy interest in his cell
or possessory interest in his effects therein).
147 Compare Oral Argument in King at 11 (cited in note 18) ( Justice Sotomayor: “As I
read Samson, it was the special relationship between the parolee or the probationary person,
that line of cases, and the assumption being that they’re out in the world, I think, by the
largesse of the State. So the State has a right to search their home, just as it would their
cell, essentially.”); id at 24 (Chief Justice Roberts: “According to Samson and Knights,
you’re dealing with people who are still subject to the—criminal sentence.”). See also
Murphy, 127 Harv L Rev at 185 (cited in note 16) (stating that “Samson is not an iconic
case describing the core of the Fourth Amendment,” rather, “[i]t was, until King, an outlier”
permitting suspicionless searches for law enforcement purposes. Samson was “explicable
only as a reflection of the all but extinguished privacy expectations of those [under] con-
ditional liberty.”) (footnote omitted).
148 Samson, 547 US at 843.
149 King, 133 S Ct at 1966.
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several places Kennedy’s opinion appeared to confine the analysis
to those arrested for serious offenses. Indeed, Kennedy stated in
the last sentence of his opinion: “When officers make an arrest
supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they
bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking
and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like finger-
printing and photographing, a legitimate police booking proce-
dure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”150
On the other hand, a few passages in the opinion indicate that
the Court’s analysis might apply to all arrestees. For example,
Kennedy noted that Maryland’s law is similar to laws enacted by
other states and the federal government that authorize “the col-
lection of DNA from . . . all arrestees.”151 Moreover, the logic of
King would seem to extend to all arrestees. Indeed, in his dissenting
opinion, Justice Scalia directly challenged the proposition that
King will apply only to persons arrested for serious crimes:
I cannot imagine what principle could possibly justify [limiting King’s
holding to serious offenses], and the Court does not attempt to suggest
any. If one believes that DNA will ‘identify’ someone arrested for as-
sault, he must believe that it will ‘identify’ someone arrested for a traffic
offense. This Court does not base its judgments on senseless distinc-
tions. At the end of the day, logic will out. . . . Make no mistake about
it: As an entirely predictable consequence of today’s decision, your
DNA can be taken and entered into a national DNA database if you
are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason.152
Tellingly, Justice Kennedy did not respond to Scalia’s challenge.
Although the only issue before the Court in King concerned DNA
testing of persons arrested for violent offenses, the federal gov-
ernment takes DNA samples from all arrestees, and seven states
collect DNA samples from a subset of misdemeanor arrestees.153
Moreover “a growing number of local law enforcement agencies
across the country” now take DNA samples from anyone arrested
150 Id at 1980 (emphasis added).
151 Id at 1968 (emphasis added).
152 Id at 1989 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
153 42 USC A § 14135(a). Alabama, Ala Code Ann § 36-18-25 (2013); Arizona, Ariz
Rev Stat Ann § 13-610(L) (2013); Kansas, Kan Stat Ann § 21-2511 (2013); Louisiana, La
Rev Stat Ann § 609 (2013); Minnesota, Minn Stat Ann § 299C105 (2013); South Carolina,
SC Code Ann § 23-3-620 (2009); and South Dakota, SD Cod Laws § 23-5A-16.
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for minor offenses.154 This phenomenon will no doubt “accelerate”
after King.155 This trend is not surprising, for many law enforce-
ment officials insist that “the crime-solving benefits of local da-
tabases are dramatic.”156
When lower courts are confronted with constitutional chal-
lenges to DNA testing of persons arrested for minor offenses, they
will naturally look to the Court for guidance. Because Justice Ken-
nedy offered no reply to Scalia, lower court judges will have to
decide how to interpret King, and in light of that exchange, most
judges are likely to uphold DNA testing for all arrestees. It is,
after all, a familiar adage that silence can be seen as assent.
Another issue is whether the police can use DNA testing on
persons stopped for investigative detention.157 One week after King
was decided, the New York Times reported that some local police
departments were “taking DNA from people on the mere suspi-
cion of a crime, long before any arrest, and holding on to it re-
gardless of the outcome.”158 Indeed, the police have been taking
154 Joseph Goldstein, Police Agencies Are Assembling Records of DNA, NY Times ( June
12, 2013), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/13/us/police-agencies-are-assem-
bling-records-of-dna.html?pagewantedpall; see also Tami Abdollah, Arrested in O.C.? A
DNA Sample Could Buy Freedom, LA Times (Sept 17, 2009), online at http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/2009/sep/17/local/me-oc-dna17 (describing a policy instituted by the Or-
ange County, California District Attorney “offering a deal to some people who have only
been arrested: give a DNA sample and have your charges dropped. . . . The [policy] applies
to people arrested for nonviolent misdemeanors, including petty theft, trespassing and
low-level drug-possession felonies.”).
155 Goldstein, Police Agencies (cited in note 154). The public safety director of Bensalem
Township, Pennsylvania, read King in just this manner: “In light of the Supreme Court
decision, more and more organizations are going to be [expanding DNA collection].” Id.
See also King, 133 S Ct at 1989 (Scalia, J, dissenting). Professor Erin Murphy agrees.
According to Murphy, “King is a green light” to conduct more DNA testing. “It’s a ringing
endorsement of DNA testing, and many law enforcement agencies would see this as a
dramatic opportunity to expand DNA collection.” Goldstein, Police Agencies (cited in note
154).
156 Goldstein, id.
157 The federal government already obtains DNA samples from noncitizens detained by
federal officers. See 42 USC § 14135(a). This section permits, as prescribed by the Attorney
General’s regulations, collecting “DNA samples from . . . non-United States persons who
are detained under the authority of the United States” (emphasis added). To be sure, the
word “detained” is ambiguous in this context. Neither the statute nor the Attorney Gen-
eral’s regulations define the term. The sponsor of the DNA Fingerprint Act stated, “the
word ‘detained’ covers a wide spectrum of circumstances. The dictionary definition of
‘detained’ is to keep from proceeding or to keep in custody or temporary confinement.”
Statement of Senator Kyle, 151 Cong Rec S13757 (daily ed, Dec 16, 2005). Perhaps,
“detained” means persons held in custody, but does not apply to persons temporarily seized
for investigation as occurs during a Terry stop.
158 Goldstein, Police Agencies (cited in note 154). According to the New York Times, “New
York City has amassed a database with the profiles of 11,000 crime suspects. In Orange
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forensic evidence from persons suspected, but not yet arrested, for
many years. Not only is the Court aware of the practice, but it
has signaled its approval.
The Court first confronted the practice of taking forensic evi-
dence prior to arrest a year after Terry. In Davis v Mississippi,159
the police brought Davis to a police station for fingerprinting and
questioning in the course of a rape investigation. Davis’s finger-
prints matched those found at the crime scene and he was therefore
convicted of rape. The Court held the detention unconstitutional
because it had not been authorized by a judicial warrant, and it
therefore suppressed the fingerprint evidence. The Court sug-
gested, however, that it might approve a different type of finger-
printing detention. Speaking for the Court, Justice William Bren-
nan wrote that, “because of the unique nature of the fingerprinting
process, such detentions might be valid, under narrowly defined
circumstances, even though there is no probable cause in the tra-
ditional sense.”160 Brennan explained that fingerprinting is less
intrusive than other types of searches; it does not require the type
of probing into a suspect’s private life or thoughts that is associated
with interrogation; it is inherently more reliable than eyewitness
identifications or confessions; it is not subject to police manipu-
lation; and because fingerprints cannot be destroyed, the detention
can be planned by the police and authorized by a judicial war-
rant.161
County, California, the district attorney’s office has 90,000 profiles, many obtained from
low-level defendants who give DNA as part of a plea bargain or in return for having the
charges against them dropped. . . . Others want to compile DNA profiles from suspects
or low-level offenders long before their DNA might be captured by the state or national
databases, which typically require conviction or arrest.”
159 Davis v Mississippi 394 US 721 (1969).
160 Id at 727.
161 Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice John Harlan made clear his view that, under a
different set of facts than those presented in Davis, a “compelled submission to finger-
printing would not amount to a Fourth Amendment violation even in the absence of a
warrant.” Harlan felt that question should be left open. Id at 728–29 (Harlan, J, con-
curring). “The Davis dictum has had considerable impact.” LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure
§ 9.8(b) at 975–76 (cited in note 3) (noting that laws have been enacted authorizing
detention at a police station on less than probable cause for certain identification pro-
cedures, and that courts have “consistently” upheld such laws and such procedures even
in the absence of an authorizing statute or court rule). Professor Kaye believes that the
dicta from Davis “suggest[s] that the Supreme Court would uphold compulsory acquisition
of biometric data from a person when the process is not physically or mentally invasive,
when the data are useful primarily to link individuals to crime scenes or to establish the
true identity of a given individual, and when the data are valid, reliable, and effective for
this purpose.” Kaye, 34 J L Med & Ethics at 193 (cited in note 28) (footnote omitted).
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The door Davis opened for possible forensic detentions was
opened still wider in Hayes v Florida.162 The issue in Hayes was
whether the Fourth Amendment permits the police to transport
a suspect to a police station for fingerprinting without his consent
and absent probable cause or a warrant. Relying on Davis, the
Court held that the police cannot constitutionally seize an indi-
vidual and transport him to a police station for investigative de-
tention. The Court implied, however, that street detentions for fin-
gerprinting might be consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
Speaking for the Court, Justice White suggested “that a brief
detention in the field for the purpose of fingerprinting, where
there is only reasonable suspicion not amounting to probable
cause,” might be constitutional.163 Noting that Terry and similar
decisions had held that a brief detention of a suspicious person is
permissible “in order to determine his identity,”164 “to pose ques-
tions to the person, or to detain the person briefly while attempting
to obtain further information,”165 White concluded that the
Fourth Amendment might
permit seizures for the purpose of fingerprinting, if there is reasonable
suspicion that the suspect has committed a criminal act, if there is a
reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting will establish or negate
the suspect’s connection with that crime, and if the procedure is carried
out with dispatch.166
If, as Hayes suggests, the police can fingerprint a suspect during
a Terry stop, can they also obtain a DNA sample during the stop,
as long as they have reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect
has committed a crime and that DNA analysis might either es-
tablish or negate the suspect’s guilt? Is taking a DNA sample
different from taking a fingerprint? Perhaps. King established that
obtaining a DNA sample via a cheek swab is a “search.” The Court
has never decided, however, whether fingerprinting is a search.
Indeed, on at least one occasion, it has suggested that fingerprint-
ing might not constitute a search because it involves “mere ‘phys-
162 Hayes v Florida, 470 US 811 (1985).
163 Id at 816.
164 Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 146 (1972).
165 United States v Hensley, 469 US 221, 232 (1985).
166 Hayes, 470 US at 817.
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ical characteristics . . . constantly exposed to the public.’”167 Be-
cause the Court has never held that there is a “search-for-evidence
counterpart to the Terry weapons search,”168 it might permit fin-
gerprinting during an investigatory stop, if fingerprinting is not
a search, but not DNA testing, which is a search. On the other
hand, it is possible to read King as authorizing compelled DNA
samples during investigative stops by employing the same type of
balancing analysis utilized in King and concluding that the gov-
ernment’s interest in identifying a suspected criminal outweighs
the minimal intrusion involved in obtaining a DNA sample, even
if it is a search.169
Moreover, although the Court has never extended Terry to allow
“investigative identification search[es]” incident to a stop, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court has upheld such searches during lawful
investigative detentions,170 and federal prosecutors have urged
lower courts to recognize such an exception.171 In light of these
developments, courts might increasingly be persuaded after King
to uphold “investigative identification search[es]” by combining
the logic of King with the reasoning of Hiibel v Sixth Judicial
District Court,172 which was also authored by Justice Kennedy.
In King, Justice Kennedy emphasized that accurate identification
of an arrestee includes knowing more than the arrestee’s name:
police also need to know “what is already known about him.”173
According to Kennedy, a “suspect’s criminal history is a critical
167 Cupp v Murphy, 412 US 291, 295 (1973), quoting United States v Dionisio, 410 US
1, 14 (1973).
168 LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure § 9.6(g) at 941 (cited in note 3) (footnote omitted).
169 In a pre-King ruling, four judges of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
endorsed this reasoning. Askew, 529 F3d at 1156–63 (Kavanaugh dissenting) (concluding
that police may conduct a search—unzipping a suspect’s jacket—during a Terry stop to
facilitate a victim’s identification of the suspect).
170 State v Flynn, 285 NW2d 710 (Wis 1979). Flynn explained that to accept the notion
that a suspect properly detained for investigation can refuse an officer’s request for iden-
tification “would reduce the authority of the officer granted by [the state stop and identify
statute] and recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Adams v Williams, 407
US 143 (1972) to identify a person lawfully stopped by him to a mere fiction.” Id at 717–
18. While Flynn applied a balancing analysis, according to Professor LaFave, no other
court has embraced this result and recognized an identification search. See LaFave, 4
Search and Seizure § 9.6(g) at 943 (cited in note 3).
171 In Askew, 529 F3d at 1134, the government urged the court to approve an “iden-
tification” search during a Terry investigation.
172 Hiibel v Sixth Judicial District, 542 US 177 (2004).
173 King, 133 S Ct at 1972.
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part of his identity.”174 Kennedy observed that persons stopped for
traffic offenses are often dangerous criminals, noting that Timothy
McVeigh was stopped for driving without a license plate only hours
after the Oklahoma City bombing, and that one of the terrorists
involved in the September 11 attacks was ticketed for speeding
two days before the attacks.175 Kennedy explained that DNA is a
“metric of identification used to connect the arrestee with his or
her public persona, as reflected in records of his or her actions
that are available to the police.”176 Accordingly, police may link
an arrestee to “a variety of relevant forms of identification” pos-
sessed by the government, which “are checked as a routine matter
to produce a more comprehensive record of the suspect’s complete
identity.”177
If these government interests are sufficient to justify DNA
searches of arrestees, it arguably follows that similar interests jus-
tify DNA searches during Terry stops. Hiibel might be viewed as
a first step in that direction. Hiibel was detained and questioned
about a reported domestic dispute. After he refused to identify
himself, he was arrested and later convicted of violating Nevada’s
“stop and identify” law, which requires a person subject to a lawful
investigative detention to provide police with his identity. Relying
on prior rulings, Hiibel argued that he had a right not to identify
himself during a Terry stop. The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Kennedy, disagreed. Kennedy explained that the Court had made
“clear that questions concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine
and accepted part of many Terry stops.”178 He noted that the Court
had recognized that the authority to detain, ask questions, and
check identification, even without probable cause to arrest, “pro-
motes the strong government interest in solving crimes and bring-
ing offenders to justice.”179 Applying a balancing analysis, Kennedy
found that learning a suspect’s identity “may inform an officer
that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of





178 Hiibel, 542 US at 186.
179 Id.
180 Id.
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particularly important in domestic violence cases, because police
“need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the
situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to
the potential victim.”181 Kennedy added that the “request for iden-
tity has an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and prac-
tical demands of a Terry stop.”182 Finally, and importantly, Nevada’s
identification requirement does not change the duration or lo-
cation of the stop. Taking all this into account, Kennedy upheld
the law.
Although Wayne LaFave believes that Hiibel “does not lend
much support” for an investigative identification search,183 that
proposition is not so clear after King. Relying on the government
interests identified in King and Hiibel, and Hayes’s procedural
framework for obtaining fingerprints from a suspect during an
investigative stop, a court could easily find that the government’s
interest in accurately identifying persons subject to Terry stops
outweighs the minor intrusion of taking a DNA sample.184 Courts
have already approved warrant and criminal background checks
for persons detained for traffic offenses, even though such pro-
cedures can take thirty minutes to complete.185 In Illinois v Caballes,
the Court impliedly conferred approval on these investigative pro-
cedures, provided that they do not unduly prolong the length of
the stop.186 If there is reasonable suspicion that a suspect has com-
mitted a crime, the state has a strong interest in obtaining an
accurate identification of the suspect, similar to its interest in ob-
taining fingerprints. A court might therefore conclude that “the
only difference between DNA analysis and the accepted use of
181 Id.
182 Id at 188.
183 See LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure § 9.6(g) at 947 (cited in note 3).
184 See Askew, 529 F3d at 1161 (Kavanaugh dissenting) (four judges, relying upon Hiibel
and other cases, stating: “Identification procedures constituting searches are permitted
during Terry stops so long as procedures are reasonable under the circumstances.”).
185 See, for example, Wayne R. LaFave, The Routine Traffic Stop from Start to Finish: Too
Much “Routine” and Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 Mich L Rev 1843, 1876–78 (2004);
Tracey Maclin, Police Interrogation During Traffic Stops: More Questions Than Answers, 31
Champion 34, 37 n 64 (Nov 2007).
186 Illinois v Cabelles 543 US 405, 408 (2005). In Caballes, police conducted a warrant
check and a criminal background check before having a drug-detection dog sniff Caballes’s
car. People v Caballes, 802 NE2d 202, 203 (Ill 2003). Although these facts were not men-
tioned in Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Caballes, he did state that the “duration of
the stop in this case was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries
incident to such a stop.” Caballes, 543 US at 408.
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fingerprint databases is the unparalleled accuracy DNA pro-
vides.”187
Furthermore, a court might believe that a Terry “suspect’s crim-
inal history is a critical part of his identity that officers should
know when” conducting an investigative detention.188 The same
government interests in accurate identification that are served by
obtaining a suspect’s fingerprints are also promoted by obtaining
a DNA sample. If the police may obtain a suspect’s fingerprints
during a Terry stop, as Hayes seems to suggest, then it would seem
to follow that they may take a DNA swab for the same purpose.189
Although obtaining a DNA sample constitutes a separate and ad-
ditional search, a court could decide that taking the sample “does
not alter the nature of the stop itself: it does not change its du-
ration, or its location.”190 Borrowing from the analysis of King, a
court could find that “the additional intrusion upon the [suspect’s]
privacy beyond that associated with fingerprinting is not signifi-
cant,” and thus justifies this minor intrusion.191
To be sure, the Court has not yet endorsed an investigative
search for identification under Terry. However, the Court had not
approved a suspicionless search of the body for identification be-
187 King, 133 S Ct at 1972.
188 Id. See also Joh, 11 Ohio St J Crim L at 291–92 (cited in note 107). (“If ‘knowledge
of identity’ has long been an acceptable objective in the Terry context, and a DNA profile
is a part of the individual’s identity for Fourth Amendment purposes, its collection would
seem appropriate even in circumstances short of arrest.”) (footnotes omitted).
189 In Askew, four judges of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals argued that
prohibiting identification procedures that amount to searches during Terry stops would
“lead to absurd and dangerous results.” Askew, 529 F3d at 1162 (Kavanaugh dissenting)
(observing that such a rule would mean police could not “remove a suspect’s gloves to
perform the fingerprinting that Hayes expressly allows,” “lift a rape suspect’s sleeve to view
a tattoo on the suspect’s forearm, even though the rape victim said the perpetrator had
a distinctive tattoo on his forearm,” “take fingernail scrapings or a saliva swab from a
murder suspect in a case where the victim was killed in a violent struggle.”). According
to these judges, barring identification searches during investigative detentions “would mean
that a large number of state statutes, rules, and decisions permitting identification pro-
cedures on less than probable cause—which have been on the books for decades—are all
unconstitutional and wrongly decided.” Id.
190 Hiibel, 542 US at 178 (internal citations omitted). During the oral argument in King,
Chief Justice Roberts asked counsel for Maryland about taking DNA samples during traffic
stops: “But there’s no reason you couldn’t, right? I gather it’s not hard. Police officers
who give Breathalyzer tests, they can also take a Q-tip or whatever and get a DNA sample,
right?” After counsel noted that the Court’s cases presume that traffic stops be brief, the
Chief Justice suggested that taking a DNA sample would not take much time: “Well, how
long does it take to—to undergo the procedure? You know, you say, ah, and then—you
know.” Oral Argument in King at 7 (cited in note 18).
191 King, 133 S Ct at 1976.
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fore King. Prior to King, the Court had permitted Terry searches
only for weapons. Nonetheless, after King, lower courts might find
that a DNA search during a Terry stop is constitutional. One might
argue, for example, that taking DNA during a stop is designed
not to discover evidence, but rather, as King found, to produce an
accurate identification. Moreover, the intrusion on privacy is no
greater than the intrusion authorized in King, and is not signifi-
cantly more intrusive than fingerprinting,192 which the Court has
already said is permissible in these circumstances. Put differently,
just as King invoked a balancing process similar to that used in
Terry to assess “the reasonableness of the government adding a
very little search (this kind of cheek swabbing) to the booking
process,”193 a judge in a future case could take the next step and
approve the same type of search in the context of an investigative
detention.194
192 Compare id at 1976 (describing the intrusion on privacy of taking a DNA sample:
“The additional intrusion upon the arrestee’s privacy beyond that associated with finger-
printing is not significant . . .”).
193 E-mail from John Q. Barrett to crimprof@chicagokent.kentlaw.edu ( June 6, 2013 at
6:48 pm) (explaining that King “is a Terry/balancing decision about the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness of the government adding a very little search (this kind of cheek swabbing)
to the booking process for . . . these kinds of ‘serious’ crime arrestees.”).
194 Although this is not the place for a detailed analysis of the issue, the reasoning of
King can also be extended to persons not suspected of criminal conduct. For a long time,
mandatory fingerprinting has been associated with criminal investigations. “With tech-
nological advances, however, the criminal stigma has somewhat lessened as fingerprinting
has become a more common form of identification utilized outside of the criminal justice
system.” Christina Buschmann, Mandatory Fingerprinting of Public School Teachers: Facili-
tating Background Checks or Infringing on Individuals’ Constitutional Rights?, 11 Wm & Mary
Bill Rts J 1273, 1279–80 (2003). Many states require applicants to certain professions to
provide fingerprints for identification purposes and criminal background checks, including
individuals applying to be lawyers, doctors, nurses, public school teachers, bankers, and
pawnbrokers. Some states require welfare recipients to provide fingerprints as a condition
for receiving benefits. See Recent Legislation, Welfare Policy—Fraud Prevention—New York
Requires Finger Imaging for Welfare Recipients, 109 Harv L Rev 1168 (1996). Six states
require fingerprints to obtain a driver’s license. Although the statutes vary in form, the
purpose behind most mandatory fingerprinting requirements is to verify the identification
of the applicant and to facilitate criminal background checks. For example, California’s
fingerprint requirement for the bar exam serves two purposes: “to establish the identity
of the applicant and in order to determine whether the applicant . . . has a record of
criminal conviction in this state or in other states.” Cal Bus & Prof Code § 6054 (West
2013). Similarly, the California Supreme Court, in upholding California’s fingerprint re-
quirement for driver’s licenses, explained that the state legislature had found that “‘the
driver’s license and identification card issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles are
the basic identification documents in this state and that the state has a compelling interest
in insuring the accuracy and integrity of this identification system.’” Perkey v Dept of Motor
Vehicles, 721 P2d 50, 51 (Cal 1986) (citation omitted).
If states can require potential school teachers and applicants for a driver’s license to
provide fingerprints, can states also require applicants to provide a DNA sample for iden-
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IV. Is King Another Terry?
Near the conclusion of oral argument in King, Justice Ken-
nedy asked King’s counsel a series of questions that, for Kennedy,
encapsulated the heart of the case:
[A] person has been arrested for a felony and is in custody, do the
police—does the justice system have an interest in knowing whether
that person committed other crimes?195
My question is whether or not the police, who have John Doe in custody
for a felony, have an interest in knowing, at the outset or within a few
weeks’ time, whether or not that person has committed other crimes?196
And my—my question is, do they have an interest—a legitimate interest
in knowing if that person has committed other crimes?197
Counsel did not provide the answers Kennedy sought; therefore,
Kennedy answered his own questions: Yes, Justice Kennedy con-
cluded in King, the state does have a legitimate interest in knowing
tification purposes? After all, “[i]f the Constitution allows the police to keep a fingerprint
or a photograph as a biometric identifier, as many courts have held, then it is hard to see
why they cannot keep a DNA profile if it is properly limited to ‘vacuous’ loci.” Kaye and
Smith, 2003 Wis L Rev at 432 (cited in note 117). And as King observed in the context
of identifying arrestees, “the only difference between DNA analysis and the accepted use
of fingerprint databases is the unparalleled accuracy DNA provides.” King, 133 S Ct at
1972. Indeed, “if DNA collection is also okay because DNA is just a 21st century fin-
gerprint, and all that it tells us is just a part of ‘identity,’ then it is hard to read [King] as
rejecting collection of DNA in any case where collection of fingerprints is already allowed.”
Murphy, 127 Harv L Rev at 178 (cited in note 16).
As noted above, the Court has not found that fingerprinting is a search for constitutional
purposes, while King establishes compelling a DNA sample via a buccal swab is a search.
Nevertheless, a lower court might decide, using a balancing analysis and the reasoning of
King, that although obtaining a DNA sample constitutes a search, the state’s compelling
interest in accurately identifying applicants for particular professions outweighs the min-
imal nature of the intrusion in obtaining the sample. King described a DNA search as a
“negligible” intrusion, “a far more gentle process” than a blood draw and a “minimally
invasive search.” King, 133 S Ct at 1969 & 1977. Moreover, while it is a debatable prop-
osition, an argument can be made that because of extensive regulation by the state, mem-
bers of certain professions, for example, doctors and lawyers, possess a diminished or no-
privacy interest concerning their identity. In a similar vein, the Court has ruled that
suspicionless and random urinalysis drug testing of public school students does not violate
the Fourth Amendment. In two separate cases, the Court concluded that the collection
of urine, which is considered a search, was reasonable because students have diminished
privacy interests due to the state’s “‘custodial and tutelary responsibility for children’” and
the collection of a urine sample was relatively unobtrusive, and thus the privacy interests
compromised were “negligible.” Bd of Ed of Pottawatomie City v Earls, 536 US 822, 830
(2002) (citation omitted); Vernonia Sch Dist, 515 US 646, 658 (1995).
195 Oral Argument in King at 41 (cited in note 18).
196 Id.
197 Id at 42.
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whether an arrestee has committed other crimes. A DNA search
obviously advances that interest. Moreover, a DNA search also
promotes the state’s interest in being able to identify the arrestee
if he commits a future crime and his DNA is found at the scene.
As Scalia put the point in King, “[w]hat DNA adds—what makes
it a valuable weapon in the law enforcement arsenal—is the ability
to solve unsolved crimes, by matching old crime-scene evidence
against the profiles of people whose identities are already
known.”198 Indeed, the Justices in the majority envisioned arrestee
DNA searches as “an indispensable tool in the fight against
crime.”199 This understanding no doubt prompted Justice Alito’s
comment that King “is perhaps the most important criminal pro-
cedure case that this Court has heard in decades.”200
To act on this understanding, Justice Kennedy had to deal with
the Court’s existing doctrine. Because the Court’s precedents of-
fered no support for Kennedy’s position, he had to create an ex-
pansive and novel definition of “identity” in order to uphold DNA
searches of arrestees.201 The felt necessity to uphold DNA searches
explains Kennedy’s unconvincing assertion that the purpose of the
DNA search was to “identify” King. As they say, necessity is the
mother of invention.202
Both King and Terry v Ohio upheld unprecedented police
searches, using reasoning motivated by a sense of necessity. In
Terry, the Court confronted a controversial and pressing issue: the
authority of police officers to stop and frisk a suspicious person
absent probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime.
While patrolling in plain clothes on the afternoon of October 31,
1963, Cleveland police detective Martin McFadden observed two
men peer into a store window roughly twenty-four times. The
two men then left the scene and joined a third man. The officer
198 King, 133 S Ct at 1989 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
199 Murphy, 127 Harv L Rev at 181 (cited in note 16) (footnote omitted).
200 Oral Argument in King at 35 (cited in note 18).
201 See also Murphy, 127 Harv L Rev at 177 (cited in note 16) (“The most radical aspect
of King is its reimagination of the idea of ‘identity’ to include criminal history and other
information beyond ‘name and social security number.’”).
202 See The New Oxford American Dictionary 1135 (2d ed, 2005) (“proverb, when the need
for something becomes imperative, you are forced to find ways of getting or achieving
it.”). Cambridge Dictionaries Online (Cambridge University Press, 2007), online at http://
dictionary.cambridge.org (select “American English”; search “necessity is the mother of
invention”) (“if someone really needs to do something, (s)he will think of a way of doing
it.”).
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suspected the men of “‘casing a job, a stick-up’” and worried that
“‘they may have a gun.’”203 After approaching the men and not
receiving a satisfactory explanation of their behavior, the officer
grabbed one of the men, John Terry, spun him around and patted
down the outside of his clothing. The officer felt a gun in Terry’s
overcoat pocket. The officer removed another gun from the sec-
ond man’s overcoat.
The Court’s precedents required probable cause to believe that
criminal conduct was afoot before the police could seize or search
a person. The trial court in Terry stated that it “‘would be stretch-
ing the facts beyond reasonable comprehension’ to find that Of-
ficer McFadden had had probable cause to arrest the men before
he patted them down for weapons.”204 None of the Justices ques-
tioned this conclusion. Yet, because of the “necessity” of the sit-
uation, the Court voted 8–1 to uphold the search of Terry. Speak-
ing for the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren stated: “we cannot
blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect
themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations
where they lack probable cause for an arrest.”205 Thus, the Court
ruled that where an officer reasonably believes that a suspicious
person under investigation is armed and presently dangerous, the
officer may frisk the person “to determine whether the person is
in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical
harm.”206
Prior to Terry, New York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals,
tried to reconcile stop-and-frisk authority with the Court’s prec-
edents by concluding that the procedure did not involve either a
seizure or a search, and thus did not trigger Fourth Amendment
protection.207 Terry dismissed that conclusion as implausible.208 At
203 Terry, 392 US at 6.
204 Id at 7–8.
205 Id at 24.
206 Id.
207 In People v Rivera, 201 NE2d 32, 35 (NY 1964), the Court of Appeals explained that
the physical intrusion involved during a frisk “is not very far different from the sense of
sight or hearing—senses upon which police customarily act.”
208 Terry, 392 US at 16. (“It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs ‘seizures’
of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for
crime—‘arrests’ in traditional terminology. . . . And it is nothing less than sheer torture
of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a
person’s clothing all over his body or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a
‘search.’”).
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the same time, the Court had to abandon the Fourth Amendment’s
presumptive procedural safeguards of a warrant and probable
cause, because no precedent authorized a frisk for a weapon. The
Court therefore improvised and explained that “the conduct in-
volved in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment’s
general proscription against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.”209 Tellingly, this and similar statements210 in Terry lacked
any citation to precedent. Soon, the Court extended the open-
ended balancing analysis embraced in Terry to other cases far re-
moved from the “necessity” in Terry. As a member of the Terry
majority later said: “It seems that the delicate balance that Terry
struck was simply too delicate, too susceptible to the ‘hydraulic
pressures’ of the day. As a result of today’s decision, the balance
struck in Terry is now heavily weighted in favor of the govern-
ment.”211 Over time, the balancing analysis adopted in Terry even-
tually became the “touchstone of modern Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence.”212
The Court’s reasoning in Terry and King was motivated by the
perceived necessity of upholding the challenged searches. Each
case involved a controversial search that the state argued was vital
to law enforcement. Although the Court’s prior rulings did not
authorize the respective searches, that fact did not prevent the
Court from reaching its desired outcome. In Terry, the Court gave
its approval to a police procedure that the Court recognized gen-
erated “strong resentment” in black urban communities.213 In King,
the Court sanctioned a suspicionless search unlike other proce-
dures approved by the Court, implying unpersuasively that it was
simply following the Court’s precedents. There is, however, one
important difference between Terry and King. In Terry, the Court
acknowledged that it was constructing a new legal landscape in
209 Id at 20 (footnote omitted).
210 See, for example, Terry, 392 US at 19 (“The distinctions of classical ‘stop-and-frisk’
theory thus serve to divert attention from the central inquiry under the Fourth Amend-
ment—the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion
of a citizen’s personal security.”).
211 Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 162 (1972) (Marshall, J, dissenting).
212 John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court’s
Conference, 72 St John’s L Rev 749, 753 (1998).
213 Terry, 392 US at 17. Stop-and-frisk practices continue to generate anger in certain
minority neighborhoods. See Floyd v City of New York, 2013 WL 4046209 (SDNY) (con-
cluding that the stop-and-frisk practices of the New York City Police Department violate
the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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authorizing searches of the person on less than probable cause.
The first sentence of Chief Justice Warren’s opinion recognized
the “serious questions” presented by the case.214 A few pages later,
Warren observed: “We would be less than candid if we did not
acknowledge that this [case] thrusts to the fore difficult and trou-
blesome issues regarding a sensitive area of police activity—issues
which have never before been squarely presented to this Court.”215
Justice Harlan’s concurrence was more direct; he stated in no
uncertain terms that Terry announced an “important new field of
law.”216
By contrast, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in King proceeds as if
the Court was merely applying settled principle to a new set of
facts. DNA collection from arrestees serves a state interest “that
is well established: the need for law enforcement officers in a safe
and accurate way to process and identify the persons and posses-
sions they must take into custody.”217 Obtaining and analyzing an
arrestee’s DNA sample is just like taking an arrestee’s fingerprints.
“[T]he only difference between DNA analysis and the accepted
use of fingerprint databases is the unparalleled accuracy DNA
provides.”218 Comparing an arrestee’s DNA profile to the DNA
profiles in unsolved cases “uses a different form of identification
than a name or fingerprint, but its function is the same.”219 Finally,
Kennedy declared that the privacy interests at stake are a close
equivalent to the privacy interests invaded by fingerprinting. “The
additional intrusion upon the arrestee’s privacy beyond that as-
sociated with fingerprinting is not significant, and DNA is a mark-
edly more accurate form of identifying arrestees.”220
Chief Justice Warren wanted to confine the police power newly
approved in Terry to cases where police safety was threatened,221
but Terry’s “reasonableness” analysis was soon extended to give
214 Terry, 392 US at 4.
215 Id at 9.
216 Id at 31 (Harlan, J, concurring).
217 King, 133 S Ct at 1970.
218 Id at 1972.
219 Id.
220 Id at 1976.
221 Barrett, 72 St John’s L Rev at 794 (cited in note 212) (“Terry would be, as Warren
saw things, a decision that gave the Court’s limited approval solely to Detective Mc-
Fadden’s frisks of the three men.”).
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the police additional authority to detain suspicious persons in con-
texts presenting no danger to the police.222 Terry, in other words,
fundamentally changed Fourth Amendment law and diminished
Fourth Amendment protections. It is too early to assert that King
will inevitably alter search and seizure jurisprudence.223 Eight years
ago, I predicted that the Court would not invalidate a DNA ar-
restee statute “on Fourth Amendment or any other constitutional
grounds.”224 Now, I predict that King will follow in Terry’s foot-
steps and chart a path that similarly narrows Fourth Amendment
liberties.225
222 See, for example, United States v Montoya de Hernandez, 473 US 531 (1985) (Terry
analysis used, in part, to uphold a sixteen-hour border detention of a person suspected of
alimentary canal smuggling); United States v Place, 462 US 696 (1983) (Terry analysis used
to validate detention of luggage for investigation); Florida v Royer, 460 US 491 (1983)
(Terry analysis supports detaining a person suspected of narcotics smuggling); Michigan v
Summers, 452 US 692 (1981) (Terry analysis used to uphold detention of occupants found
on premises subject to a search warrant for contraband).
223 Compare Murphy, 127 Harv L Rev at 196 (cited in note 16) (“Whether [King] marks
the beginning of a new era, however, only time will tell.”).
224 Maclin, 33 J L Med & Ethics at 118 n 261 (cited in note 120).
225 It is worth noting that the Obama administration cites King to defend the consti-
tutionality of a program whereby the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court directs tele-
communications companies to provide telephone “metadata” in bulk to the National Se-
curity Agency (“NSA”). Under this program, analysts from the NSA have access to tele-
phone metadata from almost every telephone call made “within the United States and
between the United States and foreign countries.” Federal Government, Administration
White Paper: Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata Under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act
at 1 (Aug 8, 2013). By the government’s account, telephone metadata “includes information
about what telephone numbers were used to make and receive the calls, when the calls
took place, and how long the calls lasted.” The phone companies do not report any
information about the content of calls. Id.
The Obama administration contends that even if the collection of telephone metadata
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, the Court’s reasonableness standard
“authoriz[es] the Government to conduct large-scale, but minimally intrusive, suspicionless
searches.” Id at 21. The administration cites King’s balancing test to conclude that a
balancing analysis “overwhelmingly favors the Government in this context.” Id. The ad-
ministration argues that telephone metadata collection results only in a “minimal” intrusion
on privacy interests, the program does not collect or disclose the content of calls, and
data may be accessed only when the government has a reasonable suspicion that a particular
phone number is associated with a specific foreign terrorist organization. The government
emphasizes that “only an exceedingly small fraction of the data collected has ever been
seen,” and claims that this “weighs heavily in the Fourth Amendment calculus.” Id (citing
King, 133 S Ct at 1979, for the proposition that intrusions on privacy interests are limited
when DNA analysis is used to provide identification information alone).
As this article goes to press, two federal district courts have split on the constitutionality
of the NSA’s telephone surveillance program. See Klayman v Obama, 2013 WL 6571596,
*2 (DDC 2013); ACLU v Clapper, 2013 WL 6819708, *21 (SDNY 2013).
Although this is not the place to closely examine whether the government action to
collect and review phone records is constitutional, it is interesting to note the similarities
between DNA registries and the NSA telephone surveillance program. Both intrusions
involve collecting and storing vast amounts of personal information, and are executed
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Forty years ago, Justice Powell bluntly stated that an arrestee
retains no privacy interest in his person in the face of “a legitimate
and overriding government concern.”226 He saw no reason to frus-
trate law enforcement goals by requiring that every search incident
to arrest be justified by the twin rationales of seizing evidence or
weapons; searches could serve other government interests as
well—like solving crimes. “The search incident to arrest is rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment because the privacy interest
protected by that constitutional guarantee is legitimately abated
by the fact of arrest.”227
I believe the result in King is best explained as a search incident
to arrest. Taking DNA samples from arrestees may help close
unsolved crimes.228 It certainly accelerated the identification of
King as the perpetrator of an unresolved rape. But the search
incident to arrest doctrine does not allow DNA searches. Rather
than openly confront this obstacle and expand the boundaries of
permissible searches incident to arrest, Justice Kennedy’s opinion
in King fashioned a definition of “identification” that allowed the
Court to elude settled doctrine. More troubling, King invites law
without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. Both intrusions also yield potential fruits
that facilitate law enforcement interests.
While many are alarmed that the government collects and warehouses massive amounts
of information about individuals, extensive surveillance and data mining do not necessarily
amount to a Fourth Amendment violation. Indeed, when confronted with comparable
intrusions in prior cases, the Court has not ruled that collecting and stockpiling large
amounts of information publicly disclosed or revealed to third parties constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment. The Court most recently considered collection of infor-
mational data in United States v Jones, 132 S Ct 945 (2012). Jones held that a search occurred
when the government attached a global positioning system (GPS) tracking device to a
vehicle and used that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on the streets for twenty-
eight days. However, the result in Jones did not turn on the amount of data revealed and
retained through government surveillance, but on the trespass associated with the attach-
ment of the GPS device. Thus, Jones did not decide whether obtaining extensive location
data is a search, let alone an unreasonable search. Compare id at 955 (Sotomayor, J,
concurring) (observing that “GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record
of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”).
At first glance, the result and reasoning of King seem to be miles away from the broad
data mining involved with the NSA’s telephone surveillance program. Yet, it is telling that
the government views King as support for collecting and analyzing the nation’s telephone
metadata.
226 Robinson, 414 US at 237 (Powell, J, concurring).
227 Id at 237–38 (footnote omitted).
228 Although some law enforcement officials and scholars argue that expanding DNA
databases will help solve more cold cases and deter future crimes, Professors Brandon
Garrett and Erin Murphy contend that “[r]esearch shows that bigger is only better if
DNA databases grow in the right way: by entering more samples from crime scenes, not
samples from arrestees.” Garrett and Murphy, Supreme Court 2013 (cited in note 96).
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enforcement officials to extend DNA searches to persons arrested
for any offense and even to persons merely detained by the police.
Justice Scalia may be right that “most Members of the Court” are
not quite ready to “just come out and say that any suspicionless
search of an arrestee is allowed if it will be useful to solve
crimes.”229 More time is needed before the Court will openly em-
brace that result. That conclusion is coming, and King’s balancing
analysis provides the template for achieving that goal.
229 King, 133 S Ct at 1982 n 1 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
